



The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

- EDITORIAL
- COMMENTS
- BORDERLESS DEBATE
- FEDERALIST ACTION
- BOOK REVIEWS

EDITORIAL

- The Decline of the US and Russia and the Rise of Global South *Lucio Levi*
4

COMMENTS

- General Artificial Intelligence: A Global Existential Threat *Fernando A. Iglesias*
7
- A Deluge of Information Hampers our Ability to Think *Raúl Zibechi*
10
- Israeli Democracy Is Fighting for Its Life *Yuval Noah Harari*
12
- Time to Finalize the Federalization of the EU *Roberto Castaldi*
14
- G20 Leaders must tax extreme wealth
16
- Climate or Weapons. Europe's Two Faces of the Apocalypse *Roberta de Monticelli*
18
- Fighting Sovereignism? European Solidarity Beyond the Nation-state *Céline Spector*
20
- On the Two Dimensions of Global Democracy *Petter Ölmunger*
24
- The Struggle for the Exploitation of Seabeds *Mario Calvo-Platero*
26
- International Poll: Public Supports a World Parliament and World Law *Andreas Bummel*
28
- A New Mandate on Democracy at the UN Human Rights Council *Gulnara Shahinian*
31
- H.G. Wells and Human Rights *René Wadlow*
33
- Benjamin Ferencz: The Man Who Sought Peace Through Law *Olivier Beauvallet*
35

BORDERLESS DEBATE:

- THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND THE FORMATION OF A EUROPEAN PARTY SYSTEM**
2024 European Parliament Elections: the Union to Come *Flavio Brugnoli*
39

Elected MPs, Candidates, Dare on Federalism! *Luc Landrot*

42

Towards the 2024 Vote: the European Power Struggle Has Begun *Alberto Majocchi*

44

FEDERALIST ACTION

Let's Open a New Phase of European Migration Policies Based on Rights

46

Three Proposals for Safe and Legal Migration Routes to Europe

48

Vilnius NATO Summit: Unconditional support for Ukraine is Paramount to Protect Europe's Future

50

UN Must Acknowledge Need of "Major Overhaul", Civil Society Document Says

51

BOOK REVIEWS

An Assessment of the Ongoing Validity of Kissinger's and Monnet's Schools of Thought

Ludovica Vecchio

53

Energy, a Destabilizing Factor *Adriana Castagnoli*

54

Piketty on Creating a Just Society in the US and Europe *Joseph Preston Baratta*

56

The EU Seen from the Inside by a Federalist Journalist *Catherine Vieilledent*

58

Ernesto Rossi: a Life for European Federalism *Raymond Krakovitch*

60

Democratism as a New Research Paradigm? *Hans Leander*

61

The Occitans: a People in Search of a New Federal Democracy *Giampiero Bordino*

62

CONTRIBUTORS

64

The Decline of the US and Russia and the Rise of Global South

Lucio Levi

Unlike the previous cycles of world politics, when the international order was ensured by the hegemonic stability of one single great power – first the Pax Britannica, then the Pax Americana – today a power redistribution between global actors is underway, but none owns the necessary resources to aspire to world hegemony. If this trend is confirmed, it will be possible to assert that the Cold War was the last old-style conflict for world hegemony.

August 2023 marked a new step on the way of the decline of the great powers of the time of the Cold War. The West, which represents less than 10% of the world's population, cannot think of maintaining the economic, technological, political and military hegemony permanently. Considering that the world's population has more than tripled since the middle of last century and, meaningfully, did not grow in the North, the relative weights between the North and the South of the world have significantly changed. Demography is one of the most powerful forces which bring about change in our time. Over a large part of history human society was made up of a large number of young people and few elderly. What is new nowadays is the need to ensure development and welfare in a world in which new generations are becoming a scarce resource in comparison with a constant increase of aged people.

Another aspect of the decline of the West is the fact that Fitch, the American rating agency, downgraded US sovereign debt from AAA to

AA+. The US debt has reached the record figure of 30.000 billion dollars. In the immediate future, nothing much should change. Already in 2011 S&P downgraded the US sovereign rating, but it did not have a meaningful impact on global markets. The high and rising US debt has been a well-known issue for a long time, but is generally ignored in spite of the country's finances deteriorating, due to tax cuts, new spending initiatives, economic shocks and repeated political gridlocks. Paul Krugman, winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics, commenting on the downgrading of US debt, recently asserted that "most economists believe that there is some limit to how much debt the US government can take on ... But history and experience of other countries suggest that we're still a long way from that limit". However, it is to be taken into account that the dollar does not enjoy unlimited trust any longer.

In August, the psychological threshold of 100 rubles for one dollar was crossed in Russia. This considerable depreciation of the ruble obliged the Russian Central Bank to raise interest rates. The ruble is at its lowest level. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, it has lost 27% of its value.

The summit meeting of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) – a grouping of states that accounts for about 40% of the world's population, a share that will increase next year when six new states (Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia and

Argentina) will join – announced the aim of the “Global South” to reduce the dominance of the US and the West on the rest of the world. It is worth adding that this grouping includes two permanent members of the UN Security Council and three nuclear powers, and the GDP of that alliance would amount to 32% of world GDP, while China and the US represent respectively 19% and 15% of world GDP. The meeting, held in Johannesburg last August, expressed the determination of its member states to free themselves from the hegemony of the dollar as world reserve currency. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva called for the BRICS countries to create a common currency.

It is right to take this goal into consideration, being aware that so far the cohesion of the BRICS was not ensured by any structural or organizational setup. For the time being, they form a heterogeneous coalition of competing powers, whose common objective is to fight against the hegemonic pretension of the West. Their common objective is the defense of national sovereignty, based on the illusion that nationalism offers a protection against globalization and international disorder. Globalization has accelerated the movement of goods, services, people, capital and information in ways that hamper the states’ ability to regulate many activities on their territory. It promoted a spectacular growth in China and India and the other BRICS countries, allowing to lift one billion people out of poverty. And it is unrestricted and unregulated globalization that deepened economic and social inequalities in capitalist societies. Therefore, multinational corporations have gained the upper hand over states, even the most powerful, and global finance has prevailed over the real economy.

The only way to let governments recover control over their economic and financial systems is to transfer the locus of legislative

and enforcement authority to international organizations, and ultimately to a world government and a world federation. However, the dollar’s downgrade can mark the beginning of a new global trend. What most observers neglect to consider is the fact that Iran, Brazil and Saudi Arabia abandoned the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and began using the Chinese yuan when trading oil. But it is the euro, the second most important currency in the international monetary system, that substantially changed the strength relations between currencies at world level. The most visible trend is towards the formation of a multipolar balance of power among regional blocs, like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the League of Arab States (LAS), China, the African Union (AU), etc. Among the world regions, Latin America seems closer to follow the line traced by the euro.

The de-dollarization process will not occur at once. It is a long-term process that has just begun. The defection of China from the G20 meeting held in New Delhi in September sheds light upon the tensions that divide the two Asian giants, which claim the leadership of the Global South, intended as an alternative world order to the American one.

The European Union represents the most advanced stage of development of the process that wipes out national borders and assigns state functions to international organizations, which manifest the tendency to transform themselves into federations of states. Federalists reject the idea of “Fortress Europe”, i.e. European nationalism. A victory of federalism in Europe can show to the world that it is possible to create a union of sovereign states divided for centuries by bloody wars and national hatred. European unification is

a problem which does not concern only one region of the world. It is a pacification process between sovereign states that begins in one region of the world, but is destined to extend itself to the other great regions of the world and to the whole world.

The experience of European unification showed that the integration of an international market requires a single currency. The formation of a multi-currency system, within which the euro and the renminbi occupy a prominent position, will create the necessary conditions to replace the dollar as world reserve currency. It was China that raised the issue in 2009, mentioning the Triffin dilemma, the theory of a federalist

economist who pointed out the contradiction deriving from the use of a national currency (the dollar) as international reserve currency. In fact, it is impossible to defend the value of a reserve currency and provide at the same time the global market with a sufficient quantity of liquidity. Triffin proposed to resort to the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), a basket of the main currencies, as an international reserve currency, independent of the individual states, in order to create and control international liquidity. The centralized management of a part of the reserves of the member states of the International Monetary Fund could promote the extension of the role of the SDR as world reserve currency.

General Artificial Intelligence: A Global Existential Threat

Fernando A. Iglesias

Let's suppose that decades ago someone had formulated these prophecies. Prophecy A: "A democratic world parliament will legislate on common issues of humanity such as environmental protection, nuclear proliferation, and technology control." Prophecy B: "A binary network based on electrical impulses will instantly connect the world and become the axis around which social relationships revolve. We will work on it and for it; we will study through it; politics and economy will depend on it, and we will delegate increasingly important decisions to it, starting from the best way back home and ending with the choice of our love partners." Of these two prophecies, which one would have been considered more realistic and which one more utopian and improbable thirty years ago?

Politics lags behind the facts. With this phrase begins the *Manifesto for Global Democracy* that I wrote ten years ago and was signed by top intellectuals from all ideologies. In the asynchronous world we live in, we have 21st-century technology, a 20th-century economy, and a 19th-century politics, whose basic institutions are nation-states created to manage an industrial universe which is disappearing. While technology accelerates, the timid attempts made by human beings to elevate democracy and federalism to a global scale prove to be insufficient. With every global crisis, such as the recent pandemic, international institutions show their lack of transparency and effectiveness, and their failures feed the idea of their uselessness at

the very moment when they are increasingly necessary.

Of the major existential threats facing humanity, the greatest one is called General Artificial Intelligence (GAI) and it can generate exponential impacts. Two factions have already formed around it: the apocalyptic and the integrated. Among the apocalyptic who warn about a possible wave of mass unemployment, total loss of privacy, end of democracy, and even the disappearance of humanity, the most well-known is Yuval Harari. Among the integrated who believe that when GAI will surpass the capacity of a single human being, first, and the capacity of all humanity, later, we will enter a world of abundance and expansion of our possibilities, Raymond Kurzweil stands out. In any case, technological singularity is approaching and no one knows for sure what might happen. But something is certain: as human power increases, the binary choice between heaven and hell becomes more concrete.

In our asynchronous universe, technology advances at the speed of light and politics moves at the pace of a cart. From the resulting chaos emerges a global rift. On one side, the "patriots," nationalist sovereigntists who believe that any form of supranational power is illegitimate and think that the global civilization of the 21st century can be managed by 19th-century national institutions. On the other side, the "globalists", cosmopolitans who believe that national sovereignties should be respected in national affairs but a global

institutional system based on democracy and federalism is essential to provide global solutions to global crises. Among us, there was a certain Albert Einstein, who while teaching nuclear physics at Princeton organized meetings of the World Federalist Movement at his home and proposed a world government to prevent nuclear proliferation.

Since then, since Hiroshima, the control of technology has been at the core of global political problems. Institutions capable of protecting the common goods of humanity and facing global threats are necessary to prevent a catastrophe. But the “patriots” disagree. They point to the use of the 2030 Agenda by woke ideology and discredit the UN. They are not without reasons. However, the idea that it is possible to continue globalizing technology and the economy without advancing global policies or to believe that behind them are hidden George Soros, Bill Gates and a Jewish-Masonic-communist plot is to return to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and to their consequences.

For decades, when in the World Federalist Movement we wondered what could compel human beings to understand that we are a single community inhabiting a small and fragile planet and, therefore, obliged to make joint decisions, the answer was: a Martian invasion. Well, the Martian invasion is among us. It’s called General Artificial Intelligence and it entails the creation of a difficult-to-control alien entity that doesn’t share our values but has access to all our technologies, including nuclear arsenals. That’s why TIME magazine titled “The end of humanity - how real is the risk”. The magnitude of the problem has been understood in all advanced countries, but we are running behind the facts, failing to overcome the contradiction between our slowness in political reforms and

our brilliance in accelerating technological innovation.

GAI poses an existential threat to humanity. The enormous contributions it can make to human well-being create apocalyptic risks. One risk is that we lose control of the technology. Another risk is that we don’t lose control. In the first case, we will depend on an entity that will view us as we view ants – such will be the difference between its intelligence and that of a human being. In the second case, the dissemination of knowledge about weapons of mass destruction will fatally place them in the hands of a new Eróstratos, the Greek shepherd who burned the Temple of Artemis. The Korean regime and the Iranian ayatollahs have excellent chances of being such actors. International terrorist groups, global corporations, and the two great powers vying for global hegemony can generate other ones.

The intrinsic anarchy of a universe based on the sovereign power of two hundred nations raises fears that it may already be too late. Technologically, it’s unclear how GAI could be controlled at this stage of its development. Politically, the world faces the same dilemmas that destroyed Europe a hundred years ago. The march of fascism on Rome was in 1922, and the failed Nazi coup against the Weimar Republic, in 1923. That’s how it all started. Within two decades, the Europe of absolute national sovereignties led to the worst destructive episodes in human history. Fortunately, nuclear weapons only emerged towards the end of the war and were in the hands of just one of the contenders. Unfortunately, we humans have decided to give tragedies a rematch.

Are we headed for paradise or hell? Will Kurzweil or Harari be right? Nobody knows, but technologies with global impact in the

hands of two hundred states designed to prioritize their own objectives is a suicidal formula. The fact that GAI is arriving before any form of global regulation can control its development, while we are preoccupied with stopping a nostalgic “patriot” of the Tsarist empire who threatens nuclear holocaust, is not a coincidence, but the inevitable effect of renouncing the globalization of democratic institutions. “We have heard the rationales

offered by the superpowers. We know who speaks for the nations, but who speaks for the human species?” wrote Carl Sagan in the 80’s, when ChatGPT was science-fiction. Politics has been incapable of providing an answer; then technology is slipping out of control. Now, as Ulrich Beck argued, going beyond the zombie categories through which we politically conceive the global world has become a matter of survival.

A Deluge of Information Hampers our Ability to Think

Raúl Zibechi

In a recent interview, Byung-Chul Han, a German philosopher born in South Korea, reports that “we are very well informed, but somehow we can’t get our bearings”. His arguments on the social consequences of the overabundance of information we suffer from had already been analyzed in his book *Infocracy: Digitization and the Crisis of Democracy*, published a year ago.

Han attributes much of the problems we suffer as a society to informatization. He says that the narcissistic ego, looking inward, “is the cause of social disintegration”, because “everything that unites and connects is disappearing”, neutralizing the possibility of considering ourselves one society. The conclusion is that there are no longer “common narratives that unite people”.

He distinguishes between truth and information, stating that the second is centrifugal and destroys social cohesion, while true life-testimonies keep it alive. “The truth illuminates the world, while information thrives on the fascination of surprise”, he says, because it generates a succession of “fleeting moments” that have the power to obscure reality, distorting instead of informing.

The German philosopher continues adding arguments, such as the fact that nowadays information does not allow the creation of a public sphere. I remember, in this regard, that, until not long ago, in certain critical situations people crowded around newsstands, commenting and sharing the news in a

public space. Now, however, we no longer have common stories that could orient and give meaning to our existence. There are no longer rituals, we barely have consumption and the satisfaction of our needs, Han says categorically.

He thinks that in the future “people will receive a universal basic income and have unlimited access to video games”, as state policies now offer around the world, a new version of *panem et circenses*.

It could be said that this is not something new, but the result of half a century of increasingly putting information technologies at the center of our lives. The Austrian physicist Fritjof Capra completes the German philosopher when he explains: “Information is presented as the basis of thought, while, in reality, the human mind thinks with ideas, not with information” (in *The Web of Life*).

Capra recovers many of the concepts expressed by the American novelist Theodore Roszak in *The Cult of Information. A Neo-Luddite Treatise on High-Tech, Artificial Intelligence, and the True Art of Thinking*, first published in 1985, which is almost four decades ago. It contains an important conclusion: “Ideas are models that integrate. They do not derive from information, but from experience”.

This explains the system’s persistent commitment to limiting the life experiences of our young people, subjecting them to a constant bombardment of information that

leaves them nothing but a gigantic cloud of confusion. Consumerism, the “anthropological mutation” that Pasolini was speaking about half a century ago, is their main window onto the world, obviously apart from the network of their own IT devices.

In this world overloaded with information, there are no ideas, just as there are none in the enormous flow of data on the Internet. Because ideas have always been dangerous; they are what can give meaning to reality and lives, they are compasses for exposing oppression. Without ideas and without vital experience, humanity is shipwrecked towards the abyss. Getting intoxicated with information and blocking ideas is a great gain for the system. This is the reason why I propose to think of the use of the Internet made by the higher-ups, those who are at the top, as an immense counter-insurgency policy. On the other hand, progressive media and people use and abuse communication with the aim to offer a tale of their own presumed virtues, never to have a dialogue on equal terms with ordinary people. They reproduce the systemic subject-object

relationship that they say they want to fight, placing their voters in a position of passive recipients of their speeches.

That’s why, to protect the integrity of their communities, the Mbya Guaraní tribe of many Argentinian villages regulate their Internet-connection times so that their sons and daughters are not left helpless at the mercy of an avalanche of data they cannot sort through or select. In this way they refuse to expose themselves to the disorganizing power of social networks. There are quite a few original peoples who do this, simply to defend themselves.

Also, the long silence of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, which stayed more than a year without issuing statements, can be understood as a refusal to enter the media circus to which few pay attention, and which even fewer understand. It is the silence of anger and of dignity. The Fifth Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle (1998) already explained that silence can be a form of struggle, and that “with reason, truth and history, one can struggle and win... by remaining silent”.

Israeli Democracy Is Fighting for Its Life*

Yuval Noah Harari

Just before we went to press, Israel suffered a large-scale terrorist attack by Hamas.

Therefore, the title of this article, regrettably, also takes on another meaning.

We will return to the new war in the Middle East in the next issue.

But we cannot help but remark that the atrocities experienced on 7 October can be understood only in the framework of the Israeli oppressive policy towards the Palestinian people.

To understand events in Israel, there is just one question to ask: What limits the power of the government? Robust democracies rely on a whole system of checks and balances. But Israel lacks a constitution, an upper house in the parliament, a federal system, or any other check on government power except one – the Supreme Court. This Monday [July 24, 2023, *Transl. Note*], the Netanyahu coalition plans to pass the first in a series of laws that will neutralize the Israeli Supreme Court. If the government succeeds, it will gain unlimited power.

The Netanyahu coalition has already disclosed its intention to pass laws and pursue policies that will discriminate against Arabs, women, LGBTQ people and secular citizens. Once the Supreme Court is out of the way, nothing will remain to stop the coalition. In such a situation, the government could also rig future elections, for example by banning Arab parties from participating in the elections – a step already proposed in the past by coalition members. Israel will still hold elections, but these elections will become an authoritarian ritual rather than a free democratic contest.

Government members openly brag about their intentions. They explain that since they won Israel's last elections, it means they can now do anything they want. Like other

authoritarian forces, the Israeli government doesn't understand what democracy means. It thinks that democracy is majority dictatorship, and that those who win democratic elections are thereby granted unrestricted authority. In fact, democracy means freedom and equality for all. Democracy is a system that guarantees all people certain liberties, which even the majority cannot take away.

The establishment of a dictatorship in Israel would have grave consequences not only for Israeli citizens. The ruling coalition in Israel is led by messianic zealots who believe in an ideology of Jewish Supremacy. This ideology calls to annex the Occupied Palestinian Territories to Israel without granting citizenship to the Palestinians, and ultimately dreams of building a new Jewish Temple instead of the Al Aqsa Mosque. These zealots now command one of the most formidable military machines in the world, armed with nuclear bombs and advanced cyber-weapons. For decades Prime Minister Netanyahu warned the world about the dangers posed by a fundamentalist regime armed with nuclear capabilities. Now Netanyahu is establishing exactly such a regime in Israel. A fundamentalist dictatorship in Israel could set fire to the entire Middle East, with consequences that will reverberate far beyond the region. It would be incredibly stupid of Israel to do something like that,

but as we learned from the Russian invasion of Ukraine, we should never underestimate human stupidity.

The good news is that in recent months a powerful resistance movement has emerged to save Israeli democracy. Rejecting the ideology of Jewish Supremacy, and connecting to ancient traditions of Jewish tolerance, hundreds of thousands of Israelis have been resisting the Netanyahu government in every nonviolent way we know. Since Friday, more than 10,000 army reservists – including hundreds of air force pilots, cyberwarfare experts, and commanders of elite units – have publicly declared that they will not serve a dictatorship, and that they will therefore suspend their service if the judiciary overhaul continues.

In a country that emerged from the ashes of the Holocaust, and that has faced existential risks for decades, the army has always been off-limits in political controversies. This is no longer the case. Former chiefs of the Israeli army, air force, and security services have publicly called on soldiers to stop serving. The Netanyahu government tries to depict this as

a military coup, but it is the exact opposite. Israeli soldiers aren't taking up arms to oppose the government – they are laying down their arms. They explain that their contract is with the Israeli democracy, and once democracy expires – so does their contract.

The feeling that the social contract has been broken has led universities, labor unions, hi-tech companies and other private businesses to threaten going on strike if the government continues with its antidemocratic power-grab. It has also caused investors around the world to pull money out of Israel. Worse may lay ahead. Government members call the demonstrators and army reservists “traitors”, and demand that force be used to crash the opposition. Israelis worry that we might be days away from civil war.

But the hundreds of thousands of Israelis that are protesting in the streets feel we have no choice. It is our duty to ourselves, to Jewish tradition, and to humanity to prevent the rise of a Jewish Supremacist dictatorship. We are standing in the streets, because we cannot do otherwise. Please stand with us, and help us save Israeli democracy.

*Abridged version of the article that was originally published on The Financial Times on July 23 2023

Time to Finalize the Federalization of the EU

Roberto Castaldi

The European federalists have campaigned for a federal Europe since the birth of the *Movimento Federalista Europeo* in 1943, exactly 80 years ago, and of the Union of European Federalists in 1946. As the unification process proceeded they had to change their specific requests, to adapt their theory to grasp the dynamics of the process. They recognised that crises open up windows of opportunity to integrate, but also define and constrain the policy areas where advances can be made, if an effective initiative to that end is taken by the federalists, and a national government or EU institutions make that initiative their own, and gather the necessary consensus among the governments. They also developed the theory of constitutional gradualism, campaigning for the direct election of the Parliament - to have a legitimate body willing and able to push integration forward; a sort of perpetual constituent assembly, as suggested by Willy Brandt – and the monetary union, to create a contradiction between a real European sovereignty without a proper democratic federal government, which could open a window of opportunity to start a constituent procedure to set up a federal government. This is the situation we live in since the Euro. The European Convention and the Constitutional Treaty were a first, failed, attempt to solve that contradiction, which still exists. Therefore, an analysis of the current situation of the European unification process can help us understand what to do next.

1. The EU current institutional system

The EU has a bicameral legislative, made up

of the European Parliament, representing the EU citizens, and the Council of Ministers, representing the member states.

The European Parliament is the EU only directly-elected institution. Initially it had only consultative powers. But after its direct election it managed to increase its powers. Now the Parliament is a relatively strong chamber, with some limits, as shown by a comparison with some national Parliaments. For example, in France with a specific procedure the government can legislate without the Parliament agreement, leaving it the possibility to block or repel the legislation only by an absolute majority. In Italy, the government can ask a confidence vote on any legislative bill. This de facto coerces the parliamentary majority that supports the government to vote the bill or face a government crisis and possibly new elections. In the EU, the Commission cannot ask a vote of confidence on any legislative proposal. Therefore, the Parliament legislative prerogatives cannot be constrained. In terms of control of the executive, the European Parliament is relatively strong as well. While the Italian Parliament can only express itself on the entire government, the EP first elects the Commission President alone on a proposal by the European Council, which must take into account the results of the European elections. Then the Parliament 'grills' individual designated commissioners and can force the Commission President to change them when necessary. Only after each designated commissioners received the Parliament's green light, the whole

Commission can present its program and get a final vote by the Parliament.

However, the European Parliament still lacks the power of legislative initiative, which Parliaments usually have, as the Commission has the monopoly of legislative initiative. This may seem strange, but today in many countries, including Italy, most legislative acts originated from the government. Another weakness is that the European Parliament does not have co-decision powers with the Council in some crucial areas, such as the revenues side of the budget. However, the supranational and essentially federal nature of the Parliament is evident.

All federal systems have a second chamber representing the member states and there is an incredible variety of them, mapped out in a fine volume by the *Centro Studi sul Federalismo* in Turin, A world of second chambers. The Council of Ministers of the EU is the EU second chamber. It is composed of the member-states ministers. It has various formations on the basis of the topics covered. It resembles the German second chamber, which is also composed by members of the Lander governments, but they do not change on the basis of the topics to be discussed. Under the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council co-decides with the Parliament and votes by qualified majority, i.e. 55% of the member states, provided that they represent 65% of the EU population. Even if the Council is an intergovernmental body, it is also a federal body as the chamber of the member states within the EU legislative. In many federal systems there are fora for intergovernmental cooperation among member states and consultation between the federal level of government and federated levels, similar to what happens in Italy with the State-Regions Conference. And this is healthy in a federal, i.e. democratic and multilevel, system, which would otherwise have a centralised and non-federal system.

The judiciary is exercised by the Court of Justice, an essentially federal institution. The Court contributed significantly to the unification process – just as the Supreme Court in the US, especially in the initial phase of the federation. It developed and established the principles of the autonomy of the European legal system; of the primacy and direct applicability of European law (i.e. the main features that according to *The Federalist* distinguish federation from confederation); of implicit powers, of mutual recognition, etc.

The European Central Bank is also a federal institution, managing monetary policy and banking supervision, at least with regards to systemically-relevant banks.

The main problem in the EU is the executive power, split between the Commission and the European Council. It is a problem, because democracy is about the possibility for the citizens to choose their government. Democratic forms of government are thus divided into parliamentary, presidential and semi-presidential forms of government, precisely on the basis of the citizens choosing the executive through the elections of the Parliament, or of a president, or both.

The intergovernmental European Council, composed of the member states Heads of state and government, is tasked with providing political direction and impetus. But it often decides by *unanimity*, and is actually unable to define innovative and long-term visions. The Commission is the embryo of a parliamentary government, tasked with pursuing the common European interest. It must have the confidence of the Parliament. It manages EU policies and budget, initiates legislation, and monitors the implementation of EU law obligation by the member states. However, it does not have all the powers of a government. Its main power is ultimately

the monopoly of the legislative initiative, i.e. an agenda-setting role. Sometimes the Commission loses its battles, failing to gather a consensus among member states. But it remains the main level of government where people try to think about the future and develop effective public policies, rather than caring only about politics and being overwhelmed by events which dictate the agenda, as it happens in many states within and outside the EU. Even if the Commission is willing and able to try to exploit crises to move European integration forward. Brexit allowed and the Trump presidency favoured the start of the first EU Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence projects. The Covid-19 pandemics made possible to set up the NextGenerationEU, and SURE, based on the possibility for the EU to emit joint debt obligations. It also brought the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact, and forced the current negotiations on its reform. The climate crisis and the *Fridays for Future* movements contributed to the Green Deal and the focus on the ecological and energy transition. The Russian invasion of Ukraine made it possible to use in new ways the European Defence Fund, the European Peace Facility and to start joint procurement of military equipment, such as ammunition. We can thus think of the EU as a semi-presidential system, with the European Council as a sort of collective presidency, and the Commission as the parliamentary government. However, this is not at all clear for Europeans and for the institutions themselves.

All this analysis suggests that the EU is not yet a fully-fledged federation. But it is not a confederation either. That stage is long gone! We need not to underestimate the value of what has been achieved, nor the resilience of the Union, which already today, however incomplete, is stronger than its member states, as Brexit clearly showed.

2. A new chance to federalise the EU

The European Parliament has taken upon itself to propose a comprehensive Treaty reform proposal (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/plmrep/COMMITTEES/AFCO/PR/2023/09-14/1276737EN.pdf) based on the citizens proposals developed within the Conference on the Future of Europe, the first EU experiment in participatory democracy. The current draft aims at fully federalising the EU, abolishing unanimity in the whole decision-making, including Treaty reform ratification; turning the Commission into a federal executive, and its president into the EU President, abolishing the current President of the European Council; providing fiscal power and a European defence under the executive; further expanding the competences of the Court of Justice and establishing a European referendum. If it will be approved (probably next November) by the Parliament plenary, it will be very difficult for the European Council – deciding by simple majority – to avoid calling a European Convention.

However, while the current Art. 48 TEU can be used to start a de facto constituent process, it probably cannot allow to conclude it positively, as it provides for the unanimity of the member states in the signature and ratification of the amendments to the Treaties. It is obvious that some governments are unwilling to accept a further pooling of sovereignty, and are against European democracy. But the Convention can be the place where the political will to go ahead with the willing countries may arise, thanks to the fact that the ambitious proposal of the Parliament makes it worth it.

The Parliament also changes Art. 48, providing for the approval and ratification by 4/5 of the member states. And if the threshold is not reached, it calls for a European referendum on the amendment proposal. I firmly believe that the European

referendum should recognise the federal nature of a Union of citizens, and state and require a double majority: an overall majority of European citizens, and national majorities in a majority of member states. This way the European referendum can be proposed as the only instrument of ratification of Treaty amendments. Including also the provision that, if there is the double majority but in one or more Member states there is a national majority against ratification, there should be a new referendum within 6 months in those states to decide if to ratify or leave. This way no member state would be forced to stay in the EU if they do not agree with its basic rules, nor could it prevent all the others from going ahead.

Such a solution would have a strong democratic legitimacy, needed to overcome the principle of unanimity.

Furthermore, it could help solve an essentially political problem, that risks derailing the whole constituent process. With the current formulation of 4/5 of national ratification instruments, the reform will probably not enter into force for political reasons. A national referendum for ratification would be politically inevitable in France, and would be turned into a referendum against the president and the government by the opposition forces. Summing up the votes by Le Pen, Zemmour and Mélenchon against Macron, there would probably be a majority against ratification. Then, even if there were 4/5 of ratifications, nobody would be willing to implement them without or against France. Just as nobody asked France to vote again after the 2005 referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. Instead, with the referendum with double majority and a second referendum after 6 months, the situation would be different. Even if the first referendum was used against the government, the second could not, because at stake there would be France's

participation and role in the EU. No reasonable person would vote to leave the EU, after the Brexit's disaster.

A final and provisional clause to ratify this comprehensive reform through the new system of the European referendum is also needed. The passage from a confederation to a federation in the US and Switzerland was made by overcoming the unanimity requirement on ratification included in the previous legal text. And it was done *in itinere*, with a rupture of the previous legal order. The same will probably be necessary in the EU. Another solution could be developed during the Convention by agreeing on specific reserves and opt-out for those member states unwilling to proceed in the federalization of the EU. Or by agreeing on a new specific status as associated members in order to remain within the single market, or other solutions able to design a multi-speed or concentric circles in the EU, with a federal core and one or more other levels of integration.

The chance to complete the federalization of the EU is an opportunity that can be lost and may not re-present itself for a long time. It is essential for European federalists to focus their campaigns on this historic occasion. If successful, a federal EU with a foreign and defence policy could take important initiatives to set up a new, cooperative global order. It could start by unilaterally applying Ch. 7 of the UN Charter, putting a small number of soldiers at the permanent disposal of the UN Secretary General. This could challenge the members of the Security Council to do the same. And it could open the way for a UN reform to include the EU in the Security Council, possibly together with the other main regional-integration organizations, which should also help implement Chapter 7. A federal EU has a significant potential to help build a more supranational global governance, so essential to cope with the global challenges.

Climate or Weapons. Europe's Two Faces of the Apocalypse

Roberta de Monticelli

The first Nature Restoration Law. Recondition. Repair. Regeneration. Reintegration. Recreation. The sigh of relief after the European Parliament approved with a thin majority the Nature Restoration Act, tends to become a wind reviving the letters of the words, making them reach theological heights. "And I saw a new heaven and a new earth". Do not laugh at it yet, this moment of imaginary relief already stretches out into the broad sweep of *apocatastasis*, i.e. the *restoration* of the creation in all its glory: the palingenesis that will follow the *epirosis*, the universal *conflagration* that will have reduced the world to ashes. Don't say yet that this display of outdated words is further proof that the law passed is the product of the "green chic", out of time and reality, according to the Italian Minister for Business and Made in Italy Adolfo Urso. Only good for the idleness of the intellectual elites and for the wealthy's mansions. It has its own reasons, however, as does the roar of jubilation with which the outcome of the vote – 336 votes in favor (300 against and 13 abstentions) – was greeted in the European Parliament.

Two readings: a political and an idealistic one

Even this euphoria can be read in two ways, a higher one and a more concrete one. The latter generally prevails in the comments: jubilation due to a temporary win of Ursula's majority over the PPE leader Manfred Weber's attempt at wrecking it, by reconfiguring a new majority together with Meloni's conservatives (ECR) and the

sovereignists (ID, Salvini, Le Pen, the far right). The stakes are the 2024 European elections. The rescue has to be credited to part of the liberals (without the support of the Italian 'third pole', Renzi) and to 15 dissidents from the Popular Party, and will be repaid by revising the law and watering it down. The EU Green Deal is not safe yet. If I have blown the Apocalypse trumpets – a rhetorical artifice called *amplificatio* –, it is to suggest, perhaps with a smile, another reading. A higher one, I mean closer to the principles out of which the EU was born. Indeed, not just because Altiero Spinelli already dealt with the problem in 1972 (*Una sfida per l'Europa: lo sviluppo industriale e il problema ecologico, [A Challenge for Europe...]* in *Il Mulino*, May-June 1972 [in Italian]), but because "the Restoration law is... the most important law conceived so far by the EU with regard to its environmental politics. It is a beacon for the whole world, to such an extent that Canada and the US are trying to emulate it". These are Roberto Danovaro's words, interviewed by Cristina Nadotti for *Repubblica*; he is Professor of maritime biology, selected to supervise the part of the Law falling in his field of competence (project Redress), acknowledging an Italian excellence in academic research. The law aims at "redressing" 80% of the European habitats that have been devastated. Whatever sociologists and political scientists might say, there aren't just the "guts" (fear and hatred) that inflate the scum in politics, but also the sterility of hearts, that is the lack of credible

ideals, which demotivates those who could resist, those who do not vote anymore.

But there isn't a stronger force than that of ideas that appear good, in human affairs: history's tragedy is almost all concentrated in the persuasive power with which demagogues – and today also world leaders – brandish the names of good things to wage war and bring death. However, can a

law aiming to retribute, restore and repair – listen to its words – be used for a grim and tragic abuse of power? No. And for this precise reason the law had to open a breach in its ideal shield made of ethics and care. Here is the true – potential – reduction to nothing: the clause allowing exemptions for “exceptional...effects” with particular regard to defense and energy infrastructures (Anna Maria Merlo, *Il Manifesto*, July 13).

G20 Leaders must tax extreme wealth

This open letter addressed to participants of the 18th annual G20 summit held in India in September is a call for action and a campaign powered by Patriotic Millionaires, Millionaires for Humanity, Oxfam, Earth4All, and the Institute for Policy Studies. It is possible to sign it at this link: <https://taxextremewealth.com/>

According to a federalist perspective, such inequalities represent a threat to development, democracy, sustainable peace and institutional integration processes from the regional to the world level. Here are the most relevant points of the open letter:

To the G20 Heads of State,

The accumulation of extreme wealth by the world's richest individuals has become an economic, ecological, and human rights disaster, threatening political stability in countries all over the world. [...] Decades of falling taxes on the richest, based on the false promise that the wealth at the top would somehow benefit us all, has contributed to the rise in extreme inequality. Our political choices allow ultra-wealthy individuals to continue to use tax shelters and enjoy preferential treatment [...]. At the same time, the world has seldom had more need for the richest to pay. [...] Across the world, people are desperate for change. Public polls in all G20 countries show overwhelming support for political action to curb inequality and tax extreme wealth. [...] As economists, millionaires, and political representatives, we agree we cannot allow extreme wealth to continue corroding our collective future. [...] The G20 must now collectively agree to raise taxes on the richest individuals, through truly inclusive and ambitious international collaboration to tax wealth and to stop tax competition and avoidance by the richest people. [...] With this in mind, we call on the member states of the G20 to work together to enact new tax regimes - at national and international levels - that eliminate the ability of the ultra-rich to avoid paying their dues, and introduce new rules that determine higher taxation of extreme wealth. An international agreement on wealth taxes would shrink dangerous levels of inequality while also allowing leaders to raise vital funds to tackle the multiple challenges facing our world. This will not be easy, but it will be worth it. Much work has already been done. There is an abundance of policy proposals on wealth taxation from some of the world's leading economists. The public wants it. We want it. Now all that's missing is the political will to deliver it. It's time for you to find it.

Fighting Sovereignism? European Solidarity Beyond the Nation-state

Céline Spector

For at least thirty years, “left-wing” sovereignists have constantly denounced the imposture of social Europe. In their eyes, the European Union, as is, can only proceed by eroding redistributive policies and threatening public services. The cold monster in Brussels aims to dissolve the existing social protection systems and the bonds of solidarity; by prohibiting state aid and fetishizing free trade, it endangers the social model originated from the Liberation. If Jacques Delors praised “the competition which stimulates, the cooperation which strengthens and the solidarity which unites”, the wish to increase solidarity has been bogged down in the sand. Before the recovery plan after the health crisis sparked passionate debates, many sovereignists had condemned the neoliberal Union. Their argument is well-known: not only does social justice find its motivational roots within the nation-state, a source of loyalty, trust and reciprocity, but a post-national perspective would endanger the already-weakened structures of solidarity within the Member States.

Even more, “left-wing” sovereignists consider that the nation remains the privileged place for the enjoyment of social and also political rights. Against a federal approach in Europe, they put forward arguments in favour of the territorial circumscription of the principles of social justice. According to the philosopher David Miller, bonds of solidarity exist within various social groups, but the nation is the largest entity that still allows to build consent towards the sacrifices of redistribution. The financial sacrifice implied by solidarity

supposes privileged links between citizens, a shared understanding of social goods and an agreement on the equitable principles of redistribution of relatively scarce resources. In this conception of social justice, the principles of justice must be rooted in a sense of belonging; a prior social bond is necessary to anchor solidarity. For D. Miller, European justice is therefore no more realistic than cosmopolitical justice. Emotional identification and the sense of belonging seem diluted here; the trust required for reciprocity to work is insufficient; consensus on the principles of justice does not exist.

Europe, Trojan Horse of neoliberalism?

This sovereignist criticism finds support in history: the Union is often described as the Trojan Horse of neoliberalism. In his lessons of February 7 to 14, 1979, at the *Collège de France*, Michel Foucault insisted on the important role of German *ordo-liberalism* from the 1930s to the 1950s. According to his supporters who have clear ideas on the flaws of the “invisible hand” of economic liberalism, politics must be interventionist in order to make competition effective and create the market society. However, for many authors such as François Denord and Antoine Schwartz, the European Union is burdened from the outset by the ordoliberal influence, which is why “social Europe will never take place”. The Single Act would only have made things worse: under the guise of cohesion, it would have promoted the only “free and undistorted” competition. The social market economy would be opposed, on principle, to the idea of a social state.

In the same spirit, Christian Laval and Pierre Dardot underlined to which extent the ordoliberal principles had been taken as sacred since the Treaty of Rome in an “economic Constitution” of Europe. History demystifies the golden legend opposing the European social model to Anglo-Saxon ultra-liberalism: in their view, from exorbitant power, the governing bodies of the EU allowed an actual conversion of the Member States to neoliberalism, just when the Gaullist or social-democratic alternatives were wearing out without return. Public transport, telecommunications and energy companies had to comply with the dictates of the Commission. If the democratic Europe is thus an “ultimate illusion”, it is because European politics are corrupt, subjected to corporate power and the game of lobbies – “systemic corruption” which would be accompanied by omertà by the media covering the embezzlement of the elite. On this account, we understand better how the ferocious blackmail done to the Greeks in 2015, conditioning the ECB’s support to the adoption of structural reforms, reveals the true neoliberal face of the European Union, subject to the dictatorship of financial capital and of his dubious hedge funds.

However, the supporters of this reading risk building up a grand monolithic narrative. It is true that a certain version of ordo-liberalism triumphed over other ideologies (planning policies, federalism) which were at the source of European construction; it is true that Walter Lippmann was a long-time friend of Jean Monnet and a fervent supporter of the construction of the common market; it is true that social Europe was often assimilated to a simple corollary of the area of fair competition, especially since the jurisprudence of the CJEU ruled in favor of the primacy of economic freedoms over social rights. It is finally true that Germany has succeeded in imposing its ideological agenda, to the point that we are

experiencing, for a period at least, a Europe under German lead. However, this is not an inevitable destiny: the teleological reading of the neoliberal Union omits the internal divergences between the ordoliberals and the contingencies of history.

Several nuances and reservations must therefore be introduced here. On the one hand, the ordoliberals coming from the Lippmann conference (1938) did not secretly prepare the supranational integration project that we will find formulated *in extenso* in the ECSC and EEC treaties. Initially, they were instead worried about the “supranational collectivism” detected behind the integration project negotiated by Monnet. Far from liberating the vital forces of Europe, the newly established “High Authority” was in their eyes the beginning of a new authoritarianism, that of the experts and the “econocrats”. Community supranationality could have served as an alibi for a “centralized European superstate,” which led Müller-Armack and Röpke to promote the loose coordination mode of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Likewise, Ludwig Erhard, who submitted Müller-Armack’s ideas to Adenauer in the early 1950s, publicly opposed the signing of the ECSC treaty, whose “supranational dirigisme” he feared.

Many first-generation ordoliberals therefore perceived the European construction as a state machine hostile to the free market. Wishing to contain certain perverse effects of democracy and its capacity to harm the owners of capital, they have sometimes fought against the European construction, seeing in it a possible drift towards social democracy. On the other hand, the trajectory of the European Communities and the Union itself is not linear. If we can make distinctions, since the end of the Thirty Glorious Years, between policies with social, neo-mercantilist and neoliberal orientations, the latter only really imposed

itself from the 1990s and was never carried out as the only one: the victory of the Directorate General for Competition over that of Industrial Affairs, more neo-mercantilist, and that of the Internal Market over Social Affairs, less neoliberal, are related to the reconfiguration of the balance of power between Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Moreover, Europe's institutional shift towards neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s was driven by certain countries such as the Netherlands and Luxembourg, then maintained both by certain Nordic countries such as Finland and by the former popular democracies (later united within the Visegrád group), who defended the market.

Finally, we must return to a historical injustice: the Commission's "Delors moment" was an attempt to create a Europe based on social dialogue – which certain national leaders (notably British) strove, not without success, to disrupt. By siding the unions' demand for a European-wide negotiation area, Jacques Delors managed to unblock the negotiations between social partners which were then at a standstill, and to relaunch discussions on working time or on information and consultation in multinational companies, particularly in terms of the introduction of new technologies – as demonstrated, from 1985, by the Val Duchesse meetings. In 1988 in Stockholm, Jacques Delors was committed to the creation of a base of guaranteed social rights, to the recognition of the right to continuing training for each worker, to the creation of a European business law reconciling the imperatives of the economy and the deepening of industrial democracy. The economic and social cohesion of the internal market was then his priority, accompanied by proposals on improving working conditions and employee protection. Subsequently, from the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers of 1989 to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 2000, various initiatives

were able to rely on these canonical texts, even if the balance of power remained unfavorable to workers and to an effective regulation of capital.

Other arguments deserve to be invoked against the Manichean reading of the Eurosceptic sovereignists. Beyond the cohesion funds which have greatly benefited Southern and Eastern Europe, several initiatives can be credited for a rebalancing towards a social Europe. The European social fund responsible for promoting employment and integration created by the Treaty of Rome has been supplemented by numerous initiatives, even though the Union is devoid of "social competences": weekly working hours limited to 48 hours, minimum legal age at 15, maternity leave of at least 14 weeks. Such "social *acquis*" (acquisitions) already obtained in Western Europe have not been insignificant in advancing the condition of workers in Eastern or Southern Europe. To the ambitious objectives of the Lisbon Treaty (social protection, full employment, inclusion and non-discrimination, social justice, gender equality, solidarity between generations, economic, social and territorial cohesion between Member States) were added the objectives adopted during the summits in Göteborg (2017) and in Porto (2021), or during the recent initiatives of the Commission and the European Parliament (European Pillar of Social Rights of 2017, Social Fairness Package of March 2018, adoption of the report on the coordination of social protection systems in the Union, or even the creation of a "European Solidarity Corps" intended to supervise the volunteering of young Europeans).

The unanimous adoption of a European pillar of social rights, leading to renounce the classic interpretation according to which the principle of subsidiarity leaves full social competence to the States, is not just an illusion intended to conceal the continuity of a policy

of liberalization, deregulation and privatization unfavorable to the interests of workers. It all depends on its application. In 2020, the decisions taken to support the European economy during the crisis prove it: most European leaders have shown themselves ready to change line in order to save their threatened economies. Since 2019, the creation of the Just Transition Fund and especially the Social Climate Fund as part of the “Green Deal” demonstrate real efforts to ensure that solidarity is exercised at the European level in favor of the regions most affected by the exit from coal or in favor of vulnerable households and businesses affected by the establishment of the second European carbon market.

Reversing sovereignism: the nation as prison?

David Miller’s pessimism about the possible extension of solidarity beyond the nation-state, therefore, faces robust objections: bonds of solidarity can be based on the sharing of common values or beliefs (religious or political solidarity, for example). Recent social psychology has refuted “nationalist” claims about trust and the need to restrict solidarity within the boundaries of nationality. The thesis according to which national identity is the condition for the support by the majority of citizens to redistribution, cannot be supported by empirical evidence; social determinants or partisan beliefs are more relevant variables.

Finally, the historical argument invoked by the sovereignists is not more convincing: far from attesting to the existence of a *national* feeling of solidarity or consensus, the emergence of the Welfare State rather relies on the class struggle. In France, it was the desire to mutualize the risks according to a contractual and insurance-type mechanism that gave rise to the first collective solidarity practices in the 19th century. Subsequently, the two world

wars and the invocation of a debt of the State towards its former soldiers played a major role. Whether in France, England or Germany, the nationalization of social protection systems results more from social conflicts than from a cultural consensus anchored in the national imaginary. The adoption of demanding redistribution principles has rarely been based on the desire to participate in solidarity mechanisms; it was formed on the basis of a social truce following devastating tragedies.

The conclusion is obvious: we must fight within institutions like the European Parliament to rebalance the European construction in the direction of a social Europe. Solidarity must be conceived on the scale of the European Federative Republic: while we must remedy the perverse effects of the opening of markets and societies in Europe and in the world, the production of certain public goods and the protection of certain social rights are more relevant and more just at that scale. The new social and environmental threats require us to go beyond the traditional boundaries of solidarity and to devise a form of extended justice within the Union. Without advocating a social superstate that would replace the current welfare states in Europe, the point is to fight against the risks created by globalization and Europeanization. Ultimately, the sovereignist argument can be turned around: nation-states can also be considered prisons, locking individuals within a life context that they have not chosen. Choosing solidarity as the new *telos* of the European Union, therefore, means nourishing the hope that, if circumstances become favorable, a more demanding model for applying social and environmental rights could spread across Europe. More than an abstract restoration of popular sovereignty, it is this European New Deal that we are calling for.

On the Two Dimensions of Global Democracy*

Petter Ölmunger

Democracy Without Borders promotes global democracy. But is it self-evident what this means? This article highlights two perspectives which this term includes.

What is democracy?

Before elaborating on the global dimension it is useful to look at the concept of democracy in general. Democracy means different things in different contexts to different people. The broad discussion on democracy therefore is characterized by a diversity of views which can be confusing. There are many different definitions on offer. Some try to imagine the ideal form of democracy. Others focus more on how democracy works in practice in a given context. Some definitions seek to explain differences or similarities between different dimensions of democracy, such as “representative”, “direct” or “deliberative” democracy. Others are more interested in the principles that democracy builds upon or promotes, such as equal inclusion and participation, or freedom of speech and assembly. This is an important and ongoing discussion.

For the purpose of understanding the meaning of global democracy, it is possible to use a minimalistic definition that is based on agreed international statements and instruments. A primary point of reference is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ¹ (UDHR), which was adopted by the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on December 10, 1948. Another important source is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ² (ICCPR), which was adopted in 1966, and entered into force in 1976. Based on Article 21 of the UDHR and on Article 25 of the ICCPR, a concise definition of

democracy could read like this:

“The authority of government needs to be based on the will of the people, realized through the right of all citizens to take part in public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives, who are elected in periodic and genuine, free and fair elections through universal and equal suffrage, held by secret ballot”.

From the perspective of *Democracy Without Borders*, this right to democracy is not limited and includes all levels of governance, from the local to the global. In fact, Art. 28 of the UDHR declares that everyone is entitled to an “*international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized*”. In this connection, it might be necessary to add that in our view the principle of subsidiarity – that each decision should be taken at the lowest possible level and at the highest necessary – as well as the separation of powers into legislative, judicial and executive branches, are indispensable dimensions of any democratic system of governance.

Globalization of national democracy

Of course, the right to democracy includes much more than free and fair elections. Nonetheless, if the definition above captures the core of democracy in general, then *what is global democracy?*

There are two main perspectives: One takes its starting point in the nation-state, which is sovereign under international law. In this light, global democracy primarily refers to the advancement or retreat of democracy at the level of nation-states. The global expansion of national democracy is one of the most important political trends during the last two centuries. Political scientists have shown how this has happened in

different “waves of democracy”. A first wave, with its roots in the American and French revolutions, took place mainly between 1828 and 1926. This went along with a gradual extension of voting rights and the executive branch of government being balanced by stronger parliaments in ever more countries. A second wave took place between 1943 and 1962, parallel to a strong trend of decolonization of former empires.

There is less agreement on the exact starting point of the third wave. Some place it in 1974 and the time of the Carnation revolution and democratic reforms in Portugal. Others point to 1989 and the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. A culmination, however, of this third wave seems to have been reached in 2006. After that there has been a decline of democracy as the latest numbers³ from the EIU democracy index testify. Nevertheless, the global spread of national democracy has led also to a globalization of the idea of democracy. Today there is strong awareness and support for the concept of democracy even in countries whose governments themselves are far from democratic.

Democratization of global governance

The other meaning of the term global democracy has its starting point not in the nation-state but in global society in its own right. In this light global democracy primarily refers to creating more democratic and inclusive mechanisms of global decision-making, either through reforming existing global institutions or establishing new ones. The earlier definition of democracy would then imply that the operations and decision-making of global institutions should be based on *“the will of the world population, realized through the right of all global citizens to take part in global governance, directly or through freely chosen representatives”*.

This clearly means the creation of an elected global UN Parliamentary Assembly and of participatory mechanisms such as a World Citizens’ Initiative or a global referendum. In general terms, this

is reflected in the spirit of the UN Sustainable Development Goals to “develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions” (target 16.6) and to “ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making” (target 16.7) at all levels. The focus of this second perspective on global democracy is the global level of governance.

Global democracy: two complementary perspectives

The two perspectives on global democracy discussed above complement each other. However, for the sake of clarity, it often would be helpful to clearly distinguish the two concepts. The first perspective could be summarized as the “globalization of national democracy”. The second could be called the “democratization of global governance”.

To build a stable global democracy that encompasses both dimensions, progress in both areas is necessary and mutually dependent. Even if all countries in the world were democratic, this would still not make global governance more democratic. If there is an effort to globalize national democracy, without a parallel effort to democratize global governance, democratic institutions at the nation-state level will become increasingly hollow and ineffective, as more and more issues are dealt with at the democratically unaccountable intergovernmental level. In an era of increasing globalization, national democratization needs the support of democratic global institutions. On the other hand, democratization of global governance needs stable democracy at the level of nation-states. Just as national democracy has emerged from a gradual process in which local initiatives and national institutional reforms have alternately led the process forward, so the expansion of the right to democracy to the global scale will depend on an interaction between national democratization and democratic reforms of the institutions of global governance.

¹ <https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>

² <https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>

³ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/15753/eiu-report-in-2020-democracy-declined-worldwide-amid-pandemic/>

The Struggle for the Exploitation of Seabeds

Mario Calvo-Platero

“Quaedam enim naturali iure communia sunt omnium”. The Latin metrics of Emperor Justinian’s code are poetic. The meaning, prescient already 1500 years ago: “And in fact – states the article – according to natural law some things are common to everyone”. It is the premise for identifying, in an immediately following article, the sea waters as a heritage to be protected among the *“res communes”* of humanity. I don’t know if the Greenpeace environmentalist who weeks ago protested in a canoe in front of the ship *The Hidden Gem* against its seabed-mining activities was aware of the Justinian codes. But his banner “Stop Deep Sea Mining” derives from an intellectual context that since the times of the Roman Empire has been asking how and to what extent our marine waters should be protected, in the lack of a guardian authority if they are beyond 12 and in some cases 24 nautical miles from national coasts. A trifle; and outside that perimeter the waters can be sifted, explored, the seabed excavated and drilled without anyone really being able to protect those pristine natural resources from the violation of modern technology.

The Hidden Gem, for example, is an enormous, super-technological ship equipped with towers and cranes that deposit a sort of tank equipped with mechanical arms and instruments in the water to explore and rake the deep seabed of the Pacific. The objective is to extract and collect polymetallic nodules essential for the production of batteries and other key components for the transition from the internal combustion engine powered

by fossil fuel to the electric motor. We are talking about rare metals of various kinds, disputed between some exclusive producing countries – China first and foremost – and the user countries. An increasingly dangerous geopolitical tug of war for the provision of these raw materials necessary for realizing the new industrial revolution, the electrification of the Planet. The problem is that in order to protect ourselves from environmental risks like global warming, of which we have had direct proof in recent weeks, despite the denial of some, we produce other risks which can have equally unpredictable consequences. The Canadian mining company The Metals Company, which operates *The Hidden Gem*, explains to us that mining activities in the ocean floors at depths of 2500 meters could fill the gap in the supply of these rare metals, essential, in addition to copper and zinc, for the economy of the future. They explain that the “vehicle” can already operate remotely, maneuvered from the ship under a pressure 250 times higher than that at sea level without suffering damage. And announce that the new generation, already at hand, will be capable of extracting from depths up to 5000 meters with pressures 500 times higher than those at sea level, to find precious natural resources. To give you an idea, the OceanGate’s Titan submersible, which imploded last June with the instant killing of the 5 people on board, was at a depth of 3,800 meters, close to the remains of the Titanic.

As always, the debate is difficult. If the need to find new deposits of rare metals becomes necessary to keep pace with the needs of

the global macroeconomy, also outlining perimeters for exploration and extraction is equally important. And the question of the exploration of the ocean floor and its practical consequences becomes suddenly topical after the failure of a negotiation a couple of weeks ago in Jamaica. The negotiation actually started under the sign of optimism after a historic agreement was reached in the context of the United Nations just last March to protect the biological balances and biodiversity in the oceans. A very complicated negotiation. How would we have behaved, for example, when different agencies, such as the fisheries management organizations, had presented rules or methods of engagement that contradicted the limits imposed by the UN conference? Or what if mining activities had pursued different objectives? Not only that, there was the perpetual conflict between North and South: who will have the right to collect royalties on marine activities? The poorer country that overlooks those waters even if beyond territorial waters, or the richer and most advanced country that conducts activities in non-territorial waters beyond 12 nautical miles? “They have been two weeks of total immersion and difficulties of all kinds” – an Italian diplomat who participated in the works told me – “Then we managed to sign an agreement. It may seem far from our day-to-day problems and very technical, but it was a historic step. We were all very moved when the announcement was made”. The framework agreement was supposed to pave the way for agreements with new rules and perimeters of activity, for fishing for example or for the extraction of rare metals or algae or biological

components which could prove essential, say, for research about cancer. But it is precisely the failure of a subsequent dialogue conducted in the context of the International Seabed Agency, an agency dedicated to the protection of sea and ocean floors, that brought a cold shower. Success would have meant the establishment of immediate rules. The failure will instead allow anyone, the Metals Company and its *Hidden Gem* ship, and dozens of other operators, to move as they see fit for at least the next two/four years. The problem is that extraction from the ocean floor, certainly very useful for our industrial needs, if not regulated could damage the ecosystem in one of the most delicate moments for our environmental balance. A study in *Nature*, reported by the *New York Times*, reveals that mining activity on the seabed could negatively affect tuna migration patterns with unpredictable consequences. This is why around thirty large companies have responded to the appeal of the researcher who published the study: BMW, Google, Samsung, Volvo and Volkswagen have signed a commitment not to accept supplies from marine exploration. And English banks such as Lloyds or Chartered Standard have committed not to finance seabed mining projects. The signatory companies and the countries that are most opposed, Germany and France in particular, fear the colossal risks implicit in the change in marine biological balances at the hands of man. Others note that a well-planned recycling operation of rare metals in old batteries could still solve the problem, pending an agreement. In short, still sailing by sight, but a first step forward in regulating a common good, after trying for 1500 years.

International Poll: Public Supports a World Parliament and World Law

Andreas Bummel

An international survey carried out by the market research firm YouGov on behalf of the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation found that public sentiment in 13 of 15 countries covered in the study strongly approves of the creation of a world parliament. With the exception of two countries, respondents who “strongly” or “somewhat” approved of the notion significantly outweighed those who oppose it.


It is often claimed that nationalism is on the rise again. But many people, often clear majorities, would support institutional moves towards building a global society. This poll confirms that they would endorse a global democracy that is empowered to deal with global challenges. Governments should no longer ignore this desire and potential.

On average, 60% of respondents leaned towards supporting “the creation of a new

global parliament that represents every country in the world, where every country would be represented based on how many citizens it has, rather than its own national government representation to the UN”.

The survey question further elaborated that the Parliament would meet to handle global issues like global peace, climate change, and emergency situations like pandemics. The Parliament would be part of a global legislative system that under certain circumstances would pass legally binding laws to govern the world as a whole. Would you support or oppose the founding of a World Parliament?

Only 22% on average leaned towards disapproval. Top support was recorded in Kenya where an overwhelming majority of 81% leaned towards approving of a world parliament with 52% voicing strong and 29%



[Download printable graphic from here: https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/files/2023YouGov_WP.png]

somewhat support. Only 17% disapproved and 2% answered they do not know, the lowest figure in this category registered in the entire poll.

Next on the list, in order of the percentage of those leaning towards support, are India (78% in favor and 10% opposed), South Africa (73% and 21%), Tunisia (71% and 13%), Indonesia (68% and 13%), South Korea (65% and 18%), Japan (63% and 13%), Turkey (59% and 17%), Argentina (58% and 20%), Germany (56% and 26%), France (53% and 27%), Brazil (50% and 24%) and Poland (49% and 25%). At the bottom of the 15-country-poll are the United Kingdom (41% and 37%) and the United States (38% and 42%) which were also the only cases where more respondents “strongly opposed” rather than “strongly supported” the notion.

An extensive study carried out earlier on sentiments toward global democracy found majority support in the UK and the United States as well.¹ The new survey as well as earlier ones show consistently broad public support for binding global decision-making as opposed to voluntary international agreements only.²

According to Democracy Without Borders which has been running a campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly for over 15 years, the actual proposal of a world parliament is that of a two chamber system. One chamber would continue representing the governments of member states while the other would be composed of elected parliamentarians. The parliamentary body thus would not replace but complement national government representation.

Previous survey experiments indicated that people prefer such a two chamber system over the status quo of exclusive government representation at the UN.³ The idea was recently

endorsed in a report of an international study group that presented proposals and principles for a revision of the 1945 UN Charter with a view of the UN’s Summit of the Future scheduled for September 2024.⁴

The public also endorses pragmatic first steps in the direction of a world parliament. A 12-country-poll released in June 2023 found that on average 62% supported the proposal of setting up a UN Parliamentary Network “to inform parliamentarians of the UN’s agenda and obtain their feedback on it”.⁵ At the time, the researchers concluded that the barrier to reforming global governance “is not popular opposition” but the reluctance of governments.

In an introduction to the new Global Solidarity Report that draws on international survey data, too, Barbados’ Prime Minister Mia Mottley wrote that “people worldwide share more solidarity than governments have hitherto harnessed”.⁶

According to a UN General Assembly resolution adopted on 1 September 2023, the UN Summit of the Future is to approve of an “outcome document” which includes a chapter on “transforming global governance”.⁷

Up to this point, however, the question of enhancing democratic representation and participation at the UN through a UN parliamentary body has been ignored⁸ in the official run-up to the summit⁹ despite strong popular support and thoroughly thought through proposals. In particular, the establishment of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, a proposal¹⁰ that lies between the low-threshold UN Parliamentary Network and the high-ambition world parliament idea, has attracted wide support in civil society, among experts, and from parliamentarians.¹¹ In September 2022, it was endorsed by then Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Saifuddin bin Abdullah.¹²

A statement released by the Climate Governance Commission in September 2023 notes, among other things, that diplomatic deliberation on “deeper reforms” of the international architecture “should commence immediately”, including on establishing “a parliamentary body or bodies at the United Nations and other international organizations to advise and better represent the world’s peoples”.¹³ The Commission will present a detailed report in November.

Governments of the countries covered in this recent poll could leverage relevant diplomatic moves on strong popular support. Kenyan President William Ruto in particular has been

promoting ambitious global proposals such as a global financial transaction tax or a global carbon emission taxation regime both of which made it into the Nairobi declaration of African heads of government adopted in September 2023. Following the logic of “no taxation without representation”, it would only be a small step to embracing the notion of a global parliament.

The data on public support of a world parliament was part of the fourth annual FES Global Census¹⁴ which examines public opinion on key matters of multilateralism and international cooperation. The data was shared with Democracy Without Borders and is published with kind permission.

¹ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/20592/>

² <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/15217/>

³ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/23635/>

⁴ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/29633/>

⁵ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/28114/>

⁶ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/29725/>

⁷ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N23/252/95/PDF/N2325295.pdf?OpenElement>

⁸ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/27478/>

⁹ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/20784/>

¹⁰ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/14179/>

¹¹ <https://www.wethepeoples.org/>

¹² <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/23991/>

¹³ <https://ggin.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Governing-our-Planetary-Emergency-CGC-Statement-UNGA-2.pdf>

¹⁴ <https://ny.fes.de/article/fes-global-census-2023>

A New Mandate on Democracy at the UN Human Rights Council

Gulnara Shahinian

According to Kofi Annan, the seventh UN Secretary-General, the “crown jewels” of the UN’s Human Rights Council are the “Special Procedures” system. It is made up of special rapporteurs, independent experts or working groups tasked with examining a specific area of human rights.

The UN Special Procedures¹ play a significant role in promoting democracy by addressing human rights violations that undermine democratic principles, such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association. The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, for instance, can investigate and report on cases where governments restrict or censor information and media outlets critical of their policies, which is an essential aspect of a democratic society. The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and association can provide guidance on creating an enabling environment for civil society organizations, and promoting freedom of association, which is essential for a vibrant and pluralistic democracy.

While a wide range of human rights are covered, there is no specific mandate on democracy. Several civil society groups and think-tanks, among them *Democracy Without Borders*, in recent times expressed their support for the creation of a UN Special Rapporteur on Democracy². There are good arguments for this new mandate.

Arguments for a mandate on democracy

First, democracy is not only a political system but a fundamental human right. It guarantees individuals’ participation in decision-making processes and protects their freedoms and rights. As a human right, democracy includes the right to free and fair elections, freedom of expression and association, and the right to participate in the political process without fear of persecution or discrimination, among other things. Democracy promotes the rule of law, fosters an environment of openness, tolerance, and diversity, and encourages respect for human dignity, equality, and the value of every individual.

Democracy is a fundamental human right

Second, democracy cannot exist without the promotion and protection of human rights. The UN Special Procedures system’s primary objective is to monitor and report on human rights issues globally. Therefore, establishing a democracy mandate would strengthen the protection and promotion of human rights, especially in those transitioning to democracy.

Third, as an organization committed to promoting peace, security, and human rights, the UN has a responsibility to promote democracy as a means towards achieving these goals. By establishing a democracy mandate, the UN would be better equipped to provide assistance to countries transitioning to democracy and promote the establishment of democratic institutions and practices.

Finally, the world needs more democracy. Democratic countries are more likely to respect human rights, promote economic development, and maintain international peace and security. By promoting democracy through a dedicated mandate within the UN Special Procedures system, the UN can help create a more stable and prosperous global community.

Adapting the “Special Procedures” system

The UN Special Procedures system is designed to monitor and report on human rights issues globally, and its thematic mandates cover a wide range of human rights concerns. While the system is not currently specifically designed to support a democracy mandate, it could be adapted to do so. The system would need to develop expertise in areas such as electoral processes, constitutional law, and democratic governance. It could help provide assistance in fields such as capacity building, legal reform, and support of civil society. It would need to build close partnerships with civil society organizations, political leaders, and other actors especially in countries transitioning to democracy to ensure that its work is grounded in local realities and needs. There might be a need to develop guidelines and protocols that ensure that the work on democracy is consistent and effective. This could include developing reporting frameworks, establishing best practices for engaging with governments, among others, and creating training programs to build the capacity of Special Procedures mandate holders on democracy-related issues.

Overall, the implementation of a democracy-related mandate within the Special Procedures system would require managerial and financial support. By providing capacity building measures, facilitating collaboration with other

mandate holders, mobilizing resources, and engaging with civil society, the system could help ensure that the mandate is implemented in an effective manner.

Promoting the new mandate

The mandate would have to be set up by the Human Rights Council and there are likely to be varying levels of support among member states, depending on their political systems, values, and priorities. It is essential to engage with governments early on to identify potential pioneers. Civil society organizations, international organizations, and academic institutions obviously play an important role in this. Civil society groups, in particular, can provide expertise, conduct advocacy, and mobilize at a grassroots level.

Further, the existing Special Procedures mandate holders should be engaged. They have the experience as experts appointed by the Human Rights Council to monitor and report on human rights issues. Engaging with them and raising awareness of the importance of promoting democracy as a fundamental human right will help build momentum.

Conducting research on promoting democracy as a human right will help strengthen the case for this new mandate. For instance, research can include analysis of the relationship between democracy and human rights, economic development, and peace and security.

Finally, raising awareness of the importance of promoting democracy as a human right and dialogue among different actors will help generate support. This can include organizing conferences, workshops, and other events. Progressive governments and other donors committed to democracy should support these efforts.

¹ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/special-procedures-human-rights-council>

² <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/26549/group-calls-for-swift-establishment-of-un-rapporteur-on-democracy/>

H.G. Wells and Human Rights

René Wadlow

2023 will see a year-long effort leading to December 10, 2023, the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The effort carries the title “Dignity, Freedom and Justice for All”. Thus, it is useful to look at some of the intellectual preparations both within the League of Nations and among individual thinkers for the Universal Declaration. One of the most widely read was that of Herbert George (H.G.) Wells’ “Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the World Citizen” which is found in his book *Phoenix: A Summary of the Inescapable Conditions of World Reorganization* published in 1942. The Declaration of the Rights and Duties of the World Citizen had been translated into 10 languages and sent to 300 editors of newspapers in 48 countries.

H.G. Wells was concerned from the 1930s on with the ways the world should be organized with a world organization stronger than the League of Nations. Such a world organization should be backed up and urged on by a strong body of public opinion linked together worldwide by the unifying bond of a common code of human rights and duties.

At the end of the First World War, H.G. Wells was a strong advocate of the League of Nations, but as time went on, he became aware of its weaknesses. He wrote in 1939, “The League of Nations, we can all admit now, was a poor and ineffective outcome of that revolutionary proposal to banish armed conflict from the world and inaugurate a new life for mankind... Does this League of Nations contain within it the gem of any permanent federation of human effort? Will it grow into something for which men will be ready to work for and, if

necessary, fight – as hitherto they have been willing to fight for their country and their own people? There are few intimations of any such enthusiasm for the League at the present time. The League does not even seem to know how to talk to the common man. It has gone into official buildings, and comparatively few people in the world understand or care what it is doing there.”

Thus, there was a need for a clear statement of world values that could be understood by most and that would be a common statement of the aspiration on which to build a new freedom and a new dignity. Wells had a strong faith in international public opinion when it was not afraid to express new and radical thoughts that cut across the conventional wisdom of the day. He wrote in 1943, “Behind the short-sighted governments that divide and mismanage human affairs, a real force for world unity and order exists and grows.”

Wells hoped that the “Declaration of the Rights of the World Citizen” would become the fundamental law for mankind through the whole world – a true code of basic rights and duties which set out the acceptable shape of a just world society.

Wells set out 10 rights which combined civil liberties already common to many democratic states, with economic and social rights, which were often considered as aspirations but not as rights. Thus, among the 10 rights we find the Right to Participate in Government, Freedom of Thought and Worship, the Right to Knowledge, Freedom from Violence including Torture, along with the Right to Education, the

Right to Medical Care, the Right to Work with Legitimate Remuneration, the Protection of Minors, Freedom of Movement about the Earth.

The drafters of the United Nations (UN) Charter in 1945 included a pledge by member states “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in equal rights of men and women, and of nations large and small.” Much of the debate from 1946, when the UN Commission

on Human Rights was created, until December 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was proclaimed, concerned the relative place of civil liberties and of economic, social, and cultural rights.

While the text of H.G. Wells is largely forgotten today, he had the vision of the strong link between freedom of thought based on civil liberties and the need for economic dignity set out in the economic, social, and cultural rights.

Benjamin Ferencz: The Man Who Sought Peace Through Law

Olivier Beauvallet

Benjamin Berell Ferencz was the last living Nuremberg prosecutor. He passed away during the night of April 7-8, in his 104th year.

Born on March 11, 1920 into a Jewish family, he left Romania at the age of nine months and crossed the Atlantic with his family in the third class of an ocean liner, then lived in a basement in Hell's Kitchen, New York. He combined the American dream with personal determination and was one of the pioneers in the development of contemporary international law.

In his autobiography, he wrote that he learned early on "never to blow out the candle of life until its time has come". It seemed to his friends that Benny's "time" would never come, he was "too busy saving the world" as he repeated in recent years. He seemed to have been forgotten by the Fates.

Having miraculously risen from poverty, Ferencz decided, upon receiving his doctorate in law from Harvard, to join the armed forces. In December 1943, he was deployed to England with the 115th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion. On guard duty in the early hours of June 6, 1944, in the extreme south of England, he saw the skies darken with the planes of Operation Overlord.

Ferencz landed at Omaha Beach in Normandy and fought throughout the French campaign, then the Battle of the Ardennes, and went on to Berchtesgaden in Germany.

He wrote that "one of the most gratifying experiences of my life was to feel the gratitude

and warmth of the French people who were liberated from German occupation by American troops. (...) It was a heartwarming and emotional demonstration of the value of freedom – which Americans as well as others too often take for granted."

Investigator and law of war pioneer

In December 1944, he joined the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Third Army, commanded by General George Patton. Few jurists were under arms at the time, and even fewer had already thought about the law applicable to war criminals. Benjamin Ferencz was one of them, having assisted law professor Sheldon Glueck in 1942 in the writing of articles and two pioneering works, in particular "War Criminals, their prosecution and punishment".¹ A forerunner among legal intellectuals, Ferencz was one of the first investigators working on war crimes, even as the war was still raging. His first investigations concerned the lynching of Allied pilots. He then participated in April 1945 in the liberation of the camps of Ohrdruf and Buchenwald, developing a technique. As soon as he entered a camp, he rushed to the Schreibstube, the camp office, and seized the Totenbücher, the death registers containing the names of the prisoners and the false causes of their death. He seized frightening exhibits, such as two shrunken human heads, which were later produced at Nuremberg. He then moved on to the camps of Flossenberg, Mathausen, Ebensee and Dachau. Then he set out on the trail of art dealers in Bavaria, and finally returned to New York in December 1945.

At the end of the First World War, it was felt that the conflict had been a terrible interruption, but only an interruption, in the historical progress of a reasonable civilization.² After the Second World War, it was not at all the same. Ferencz drew from his experience of war a deep determination to try and prevent it. He admitted the potential for the crime to happen again, but considered that only justice could legitimately respond to it. He wrote: "I was keenly aware that there was no way for the scales of justice to balance the murder of more than a million innocent human beings against the lives of two dozen of their executioners. It was my hope that the trial would serve a more useful and enduring purpose; that it might somehow help to deter the repetition of such horrors in the future."

Benjamin Ferencz, chief prosecutor at 27

Contacted by the entourage of Robert H. Jackson, the US Attorney General at Nuremberg who was looking to strengthen his legal team, Benjamin Ferencz was assigned as a branch chief in Berlin, responsible for gathering evidence. In the spring of 1947, one of his investigators discovered a virtually complete set of secret Gestapo reports in an annex of the Foreign Office. These reports described the daily activities of the *Einsatzgruppen*, special units that had been liquidating Jews, perceived political opponents and other "undesirables" for two years after the invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. Counting the number of executions on a small calculating machine, Ferencz stopped his macabre counting when he got to one million dead. When counting decades later, Ben would still mimic this calculator that must have looked like some kind of one-armed bandit.

He reported his discovery to General Telford Taylor, now chief prosecutor for the American trials at Nuremberg, who realized the importance of this evidence. But any further

funding in addition to the Nuremberg trials already planned by the Pentagon was ruled out. When Taylor asked him if he could take on this trial in addition to his original duties, Ferencz became chief prosecutor at age 27 of what became the biggest murder trial in history.

On the first day of the trial, Ferencz echoed Jackson's words from two years earlier at the opening of the Nuremberg trials: "We ask this court to affirm, through international criminal action, the right of man to live in peace and dignity, regardless of race or religion. The case we present here is a call of humanity to the law." When Benjamin Ferencz told the court that he would prove that the defendants had killed a million people, the impression in the courtroom was that these were vague estimates. The evidence would soon prove otherwise.

Despite the mass of evidence gathered and the thousands of *Einsatzgruppen* arrested, Ferencz was only able to bring 24 into the courtroom. There was no more room in the dock. He selected the highest-ranking officers, including six generals, and those with the best education from the names that were most frequently mentioned in Gestapo reports. While the evidence against the *Einsatzgruppen* leaders took only two days to present, the defence took 136 days in court. The court handed down 21 convictions, including 13 sentences of hanging.

"Slight figure and round cherubic face"

The President of the Court, Michael Musmanno³, pays tribute to him in his writings: "The active Chief prosecution is young Benjamin Ferencz, graduate of the Harvard Law School, thoroughly at home in the German language and veteran of an American combat outfit which saw active service in Germany. General Taylor assigned this young man to the task of analysing the captured *Einsatzgruppen* documents, drafting

the indictment, locating the accused men in the various prisoner-of-war compounds, selecting assistant trial lawyers, and taking active part in the trial work, generally supervising the entire prosecution”.

“His mammoth preliminary labours having been accomplished (...) He himself undertakes the responsibility of presenting the evidence (...). Benjamin Ferencz is but four feet four inches high and when he stands at the podium his chin barely clears the lectern. Only 27 years of age, his slight figure and round cherubic face make him seem even younger.” [In reality, his height was 160 centimetres].

This impromptu trial became a highlight of the American trials at Nuremberg because of the clarity of the accusation and evidence. As Taylor paid tribute in his writings⁴, the facts and arguments were so simple that this trial was of great importance and dramatic intensity.

After the great trial, the pursuit of reparations

Benjamin Ferencz saw in this founding trial a promise. With Musmanno, he was convinced that “Wherever the law exists, a court will rise”, as the American judge put it. This certainty was to shape Ferencz’s thinking and his activity for decades. As “director general” of the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), he set up reparation mechanisms for the victims of Hitler’s regime – in particular through the restitution of property, the rescue of precious and religious objects, the re-appropriation of cemeteries, and compensation agreements. The results were mixed. Taylor, in the preface to the book Ferencz wrote about the experience, wrote: “I believe that in time Germany will regret that their industrial leaders did not write a postwar record of generosity⁵ instead of the cold and niggardly one revealed in this book”.

A reparations agreement was signed, however, on September 10, 1952, in Luxembourg between West Germany and Israel. German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer borrowed Ferencz’s fountain pen for this purpose. Ferencz continued until 1956 to promote reparation mechanisms, which initially amounted to one billion dollars, and more than 50 billion in 2003. After 1956, as a lawyer, he continued to represent the families of victims who did not benefit from these mechanisms, and in particular the victims of medical experiments who were east of the “Iron Curtain”.

But as the United States became bogged down in the war in Vietnam, several former American prosecutors at Nuremberg recalled that the essential lesson of these trials was that anyone, regardless of rank or condition, could be held accountable before an international tribunal. From January 1970 onwards, Ferencz personally undertook a vast research plan aimed at guaranteeing world peace through the criminalization of the crime of aggression. He contributed to the first elaboration of this criminal qualification by the General Assembly of the United Nations, and in December 1974 he published a book that would become a landmark in the history of the legal prohibition of acts of international aggression: “Defining International Aggression: The Search for World Peace”.

Since the law was gradually emerging, it was time to create an international court, according to Ferencz. In the early 1990s, he wrote “*An International Criminal Court: Step toward World Peace*” and this work, which was relayed by several American NGOs, resonated especially after the collapse of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide⁶, when part of the international community called for a shift from policies of stabilization by force to policies of stabilization by law.

Benjamin Ferencz contributed, in Rome, to the conclusion of the treaty creating the International Criminal Court (ICC)⁷ in July 1998, and then in Kampala in June 2010 to the formulation of the crime of aggression and its inclusion in the Rome Statute. When the slowness of ratification of this special amendment became obvious, Ferencz first undertook a “tour of the capitals of the rule of law”, and then explored new legal avenues, suggesting in particular to use the qualification of crime against humanity to repress acts of aggression.

The repression of this crime of crimes that

incorporates all the others became urgent for him. History proved him right, in a striking manner, on February 24, 2022. While the ICC is investigating the conflict in Ukraine⁸ but has no jurisdiction over the crime of aggression⁹, will the path suggested ten years ago by Ferencz be explored?

All his life he sought peace through law. He revered a sixteenth-century cartographer, Tycho Brahe, who had begun to map the infinite space of the sky – in vain, according to his contemporaries. Benjamin Ferencz was one of the pioneers of an even larger space, that of peace and law, where he now rests.

* This article has been published by *Justice* and *Cosmopolis*

¹ <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1068912>

² https://www.persee.fr/doc/reco_0035-2764_1953_num_4_1_406960_t1_0123_0000_000

³ <https://biblio.co.uk/book/eichmann-kommandos-michael-musmanno/d/1425611157>

⁴ https://crimeofaggression.info/documents/6/1945_Control_Council_Law_No10.pdf

⁵ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/106304-nuremberg-judge-company-executives-managers.html>

⁶ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/40846-rwanda-the-most-judged-genocide-in-history.html>

⁷ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/tribunals/icc>

⁸ (see <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/114136-icc-arrest-warrants-against-putin-what-do-experts-say.html>)

⁹ <https://www.justiceinfo.net/en/91135-nuremberg-russia-crime-of-aggression.html>

2024 European Parliament Elections: the Union to Come

Flavio Brugnoli

There is less than a year left before the next election of the European Parliament, scheduled for 6 to 9 June 2024. The vote will start the transition from one of the most troubled, and often dramatic, legislatures in the history of European integration to a new five-year period, whose challenges and risks are already emerging. Awareness that the European elections will be a fundamental step for the construction of Europe is rising rapidly. The time has come to present both a provisional assessment and some possible scenarios for the Europe to come.

When, in the summer of 2019, the then candidate for President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, indicated the “double transition”, ecological and digital, and the “geopolitical” role of the Commission as strategic objectives of her presidency, no one could have imagined that we were on the eve of a global pandemic and would also witness the return of the war of aggression in Europe. Nevertheless, von der Leyen’s programme captured the epochal impact of the climate crisis, the role that technological sovereignty had now assumed, and the need to question the role of the Union in a world dealing with an unstable multipolarity.

Covid-19 has given a boost to the redesign of the economic governance of the Union, from the suspension of the Stability and Growth Pact to the launch of Next Generation EU, with the creation of a common European debt, to a new European Stability Mechanism connected to the Banking Union. We still do not know how

Putin’s imperialism will be defeated, but we know that action is urgently needed for a new European security, that encompasses energy (after years of short-sighted dependence on Russian fossil fuels) and military defence, within the framework of a NATO that is revitalised and enlarged by Russian aggression. Equally relevant will be the prospects of enlargement (“widening”) to new Member States, which will re-propose the theme of “deepening” of the institutional architecture of the Union, thanks to the ambitious proposals that the European Parliament is pushing forward to reform the EU Treaties.

In her 2023 State of the Union Address to the European Parliament, in Strasbourg, on 13 September, Ursula von der Leyen stressed, and rightly so, the above successes and the challenges to come. Obviously for the moment she has given no indication at all on her willingness to apply for a second mandate as Commission’s President, after the European elections in June 2024. But how are the European political camps preparing for the electoral test?

The debate on a possible overcoming of the agreement between the Popular parties and the Socialists (already a minority in 2019 in terms of seats), on which the construction of Europe has been based for decades, has gone on for some months, not only in the Brussels bubble. Are we moving towards a redefining of the form of European bipolarity between a centre-right and a centre-left? The pivot of the first would be an agreement between the EPP (European

People's Party), led by Manfred Weber, and the ECR, the party of European Conservatives and Reformists, whose president, Giorgia Meloni, is the head of the Italian government. But it is already evident that a large part of the EPP members would not support that agreement, and the polls exclude any possibility of an EPP-ECR majority in the upcoming European Parliament. Thus, the so called "Ursula majority" (including EPP, S&D and Renew Europe) seems to be regaining momentum. Nevertheless, it is worth broadening our reflections on the European political dynamics.

Several variables intertwine in the European political space: while the "traditional" distinction between right and left does not seem to have blurred, far from it, this distinction is intertwined with that between the sovereignists and the integrationists (already outlined, with foresight, in the Ventotene Manifesto). But even the "sovereign" camp appears in turn to be riddled with different visions of a European future. The "polycrisis", the multiple crises in which we are still immersed, could split the sovereignist camp and push the forces that are aiming for a pure and simple destruction of the European edifice (mostly members of the far-right Identity and Democracy group) to the sidelines.

In the medium term, the EU could see an "American" type dynamic, with a centre-right more attentive to the rights of States and more wary of "interference" at the European level, except on issues such as security (immigration included) and defence, and on the other hand, a centre-left alignment more confident about the intervention of the European ("federal") level, particularly in the economic field. However, it is clear that if (the governments of) some Member States question the very foundations of the rule of law, mutual trust and "sincere cooperation" on which the European institutions are based would be undermined.

At the same time, one can wonder about the impact of a new European bipolarity. The political-institutional system of the Union has been almost by definition "centripetal", with a broad convergence at the centre on shared common policies. Would a European bipolarity trigger a "normalisation" of the European political scene or rather a "centrifugal" dynamic, which could undermine the legitimacy of the Union's choices in the eyes of the electors of the losing side? A broad bipartisan convergence (i.e., a new "Ursula majority") on the two decisive pillars of the future Union, the economic and the security, therefore, remains desirable. But after the vote, at least some of the ECR members could join this majority, especially if it is a slight majority. However, the European elections are not the end of the story: in a "Union of Peoples and States", what should always be taken into account are the dynamics and balances within the institutional triangle of Commission-Parliament-Council.

As stated above, the European Parliament will conclude the current legislature with an ambitious proposal (supported by the centre-left parties) to reform the EU Treaties, that will focus first of all on getting rid of unanimity voting. There is no realistic chance that the European Council will convene a Convention for the revision of the Treaties before the 2024 elections (although it could be decided by a simple majority). What can be hoped is that the reform proposals will at least enter the debate during the electoral campaign and then be at the forefront of the new legislature's agenda – even though its start could be uphill, with the first six-monthly presidencies of the Council entrusted, in order, to Hungary and Poland.

The European legislature 2024-2029 will have on its agenda formidable strategic global dilemmas: between democracies and autocracies, between multilateralism and unilateralism, between cooperation and

competition. The common theme should be that of European strategic autonomy, or how to find degrees of European independence (sovereignty) in a world that is and will remain interdependent, and in which uncertainty dominates: from the scarce prospects of a “just peace” for Ukraine (along with the start of its reconstruction), to the relationship with a China in which nationalistic tendencies are growing, to the United States as an indispensable partner, but with a presidential election, on 5 November 2024, that could repeat the Biden-Trump confrontation, to the push to give a political voice to the heterogeneous “Global South”.

As stated by Ursula von der Leyen in Strasbourg, “Once again, this is Europe’s moment to answer the call of history”. As for Italy, as the European elections draw near, it must be hoped that the political forces and the media do not linger in short-sighted confrontations (favoured by proportional voting) on domestic equilibria. In Europe, political coalitions are built on political agendas, on decisive issues for our future and for the younger generations. A founding member of the Union, for which Europeanism and Atlanticism have always been the pillars of its “being in the world”, must know how to rise to the challenges that await us all.

Elected MPs, Candidates, Dare on Federalism!

Luc Landrot

A mystery hovers over French politics. Despite public opinion appears to be more and more ripe for the idea, it is the absolute silence in all political parties, even the most pro-European among them, that is astonishing.

The parties no longer manage to speak to the population, to arouse support or even enthusiasm. They have at their disposal a revolutionary vision supported by half of the population but no, they do not seize it. They sometimes defend the idea of Europe, sometimes subsidiarity, sometimes both of them, but they do not take the plunge. The omertà of the “F word” reigns.

And yet, this bold proposal could bring many voters back. Don't you believe?

A few facts

In March 2022, when the French opinion-polling institute IFOP, working for the *Journal du Dimanche/Paris Match/Europe1*, posed the question: “Do you think that France should propose the establishment of a European federal government, which would act without having to consult the governments of the member States?”, 49% of the French people answered that they are in favor of it.¹

Already at the end of 2021, in an *Odoxa* poll published on December 8, 2021, before the war in Ukraine, the French reacted to the proposal for a federal Europe of the current German coalition.

To the question: “The new German Chancellor, at the head of a coalition, wants to ‘move

towards a federal Europe’”, 58% of French respondents believe that it is “a good thing”; 63 to 73% of French men and women are in favor of a Eurofederation, from *Les Republicaines [right]* to *La France Insoumise [left]*, and even 41% among those close to the *Rassemblement National [far-right]*.

The word “federalism” therefore does not frighten the majority of French people

Yet, who really knows what federalism implies? The object of fantasies on the part of nationalists, federalism is often confused (in France only) with an all-powerful unitary central state, directed from the capital in defiance of the Member States. Basically, the current functioning of the French republic, historically Jacobin, bureaucratic and directed from Paris. But federalism is quite the opposite!

Federalism: fantasy and reality

Federalism is the translation into an institutional and political system of the principle of subsidiarity, which is intended to be a concept of delegation of power from the base to the top. This assumes that sovereignty belongs first to the individual or to the district/village, which however, living in a society, delegate certain collective tasks in the first place to the municipality. The municipality itself, having a limited territory and a limited capacity for action, delegates in turn powers to the region, then to the State, etc. and so on up to the top level, in this case Europe.

In a federation, power therefore belongs to the base, which delegates it to the higher level. It

is not the central state that grants power to the communities. Thus, in a federation, federated states and federation are on an equal footing. One is not subordinate to the other, they are perfectly equal and it is the Constitution that distributes their spheres of action. If there is a conflict between the two, it is the Court of Justice that settles that, according to the law, on the basis of texts democratically adopted.

For example, financially, each entity is autonomous, has its own resources and manages its expenses (and part of the income) as it sees fit. In a federal Europe, Brussels would have no say in national budgets.

What Federalism Is Not

Federalism is therefore not the exercise of a top-down power, a vertical power concentrated in few hands, distant and authoritarian. It's just the opposite.

This philosophy is thus perfectly adapted to today's world, where citizens are thirsty for participation in decisions, for proximity, for regaining control, for horizontality. But in a globalized world populated by empires and sometimes freewheeling multinational companies, federalism makes it possible to reconcile these aspirations with the challenges of democracy, of the values to be defended, of justice, of the organization of the world, of an opposition to external forces hostile to liberal democracies.

What federalism can be

One of the great strengths of federalism is that it

offers an infinity of possibilities: parliamentary or presidential democracy, broad competences at the federal level, shared with the federated states, or very limited powers over foreign policy (defense, diplomacy, foreign trade), significant or minimalist equalization between states, a more or less liberal or socialist or absolutely neutral Constitution.

Ladies and gentlemen, you know that copies and old recipes no longer work in the current French political landscape. Do I need to remind you how the most entrenched old parties were swept away, as well as the longest careerists of all stripes? The European elections are approaching, let's not repeat the mistakes of the past.

We, both Eurosceptics and pro-Europeans, shall not allow ourselves to be locked into a binary pro-EU or anti-EU debate. Let us embody a third way: Europe, yes, but based on subsidiarity, preserving the peculiarities of the States while being credible on the major issues that go beyond our borders, and democracy.

Let's give it a name: the Eurofederation

If you were looking for a modern project that meets today's challenges and is popular among the electorate, look no further, you have found it!

So, DARE! Be innovative, differentiate yourself from both the populists and the Euro-fanatics, who promote a tentacular and bureaucratic Europe!

¹ <https://www.ifop.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/119006-Rapport.pdf>

Towards the 2024 Vote: the European Power Struggle Has Begun

Alberto Majocchi

After the dramatic withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan – which symbolically marked the end of the attempt by the United States to impose a unilateral government on the world system of states – the Russian invasion of Ukraine represents an extreme attempt by the government in Moscow to have a role in the unfolding global balance of power. The crisis affecting the world system of states shows that a unilateral government of the world is inconceivable at present, not only due to the assertion of power by the Chinese, but above all due to the rise of a significant number of other countries, in Asia, Africa and Latin America, who no longer accept being subjected to the decisions of the superpowers, and firmly ask to participate in constituting a multilateral global power structure. In this context, a decisive role can be played by Europe, whose “raison d’état” implies that the primary objective of its foreign policy must be the pursuit of peace.

In general, the possibility that a country adopts a strategy in international politics aimed not at increasing its own power, but at promoting a situation of balance at the global level, with a view to guaranteeing the permanence of democratic institutions internally, is historically linked to a situation of insularity: this is what happened for the United Kingdom in the context of the European system of states and for the United States until the time when it assumed a decisive role in the world system of states. But when the European Union has the necessary tools to autonomously carry out its own foreign and security policy, it will in any

case be included in the international balance of power and, therefore, will have to take into account the structures of power at a global level.

The ultimate goal of perpetual peace can be achieved, as theorised by Immanuel Kant, only when relations between states worldwide are based on law and not on force, and this will only be possible with a world federation. Europe’s task is to promote the transition toward this goal. Today the world is evolving towards multipolarity with great difficulty, but this system is more unstable than a bipolar system, which, with a “balance of terror”, was able to guarantee a relatively peaceful order during the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. To achieve a more peaceful order at this historical stage, multilateral institutions must be strengthened – and not weakened, as superpowers in crisis do – and herein lies Europe’s specific responsibility, before the logic of power politics prevails, even in the Union.

These developments will be possible if Europe is able to complete the unification process, granting the Union with decision-making power in the area of foreign and security policy, with a clear outline of economic policy and with a Financial Plan that distributes resources equitably between the different levels of government. These issues will be at the heart of the campaign for the next European elections in 2024, which could be the starting point of a constituent phase in which there is an irreversible transfer of power from the states to Europe.

In his book, *Europe: A Gentle Force*, Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa clearly agreed with Albertini's thinking on the issue of transferring powers from Member States to Europe: "I am convinced that the point of no return can only be properly political; not economic or monetary, or even institutional. I remember, and I carry with me, an observation made by Mario Albertini in a conversation in which I had the good fortune to participate, as he was developing his decision on Monetary Union. 'The point of no return', he said, 'is neither in powers nor in institutions: it is the moment when the political struggle becomes European, when the object for which men and parties fight will be European power. That will be the moment when the revolution will have finished its task and the new orders created will be occupied by ordinary political forces, which will make it the theater of their contention. In a civilized political society, iron and blood are replaced by electoral struggle, armies by political formations'".

In the campaign for the European elections, the parties vying for seats in the Strasbourg Parliament will have to take a position, which is fundamental not only for the future of Europe, but also for the world, with a view to giving the Union an institutional structure of a federal nature. This will involve favouring the strengthening of competencies in security, foreign, economic and fiscal policy, but above all guaranteeing the possibility of majority decisions in these crucial areas, with federal institutions managing a shared sovereignty between the European level and the Member States, to ensure unity in diversity, according

to Kenneth Wheare's classic definition, and to promote a new multipolar world order capable of ensuring peace and sustainable development of the entire planet.

On the point of majority decision-making, an important first step is the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's proposal to adopt qualified majority voting (55 per cent of the members of the Council of Ministers, representing countries comprising at least 65 per cent of the EU's population) for foreign and fiscal policy decisions. This proposal has already been endorsed by eight other countries (France, Spain, Italy, the three Benelux countries, Finland and Slovenia). Above all, however, the manoeuvres in the formation of the alignments that will compete in the 2024 European elections appear to be relevant. The first fact to note – which also directly affects Italian politics – is the attempt by the *Lega* and *Fratelli d'Italia* parties to move in the direction of the EPP, disengaging from those political formations that are more sovereigntist and hostile to completing a federal evolution of the Union, in order to shift the political balance at the European level towards the center-right. This attempt is firmly opposed by those in the EPP who are aiming for a reconfirmation of the coalition that led to the appointment of Ursula von der Leyen as Commission President. The outcome of this process is still uncertain, but these manoeuvres nonetheless show that the struggle for European power has now begun and that future developments in the Union will largely depend on the outcome of this struggle.

Let's Open a New Phase of European Migration Policies Based on Rights

Press Release from the European Movement – Italian Council

The idea of stopping the migratory flows of women, minors and men – who flee from regions where people are dying of war, hunger, environmental disasters and expropriation of farmers' land to introduce the same forms of intensive agriculture that are destroying the environment of developed countries – is progressively conquering almost all the governments of the European Union, who adopt or spread the false narrative according to which these flows largely exceed our economic, social and cultural capacities for reception, hospitality and integration.

Associated with this narrative is the idea that the increase in migratory flows is caused by the appealing factors (pull factors) of our migration policies, and not by the factors that push people to flee (push factors), and that the flows must be blocked at the origin or, better yet, in the transit countries towards the European Union which, hypocritically, governments consider as "safe countries".

On the basis of this narrative, the European Commission and the Council have shared, facilitated or promoted agreements first with Turkey and then with Libya, not to mention Chad and Niger, where it is well-known that people who have the right to international protection are subjected to inhumane treatments in total disregard of international law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also applies to asylum seekers.

The recent memorandum of understanding between the European Union and Tunisia

signed in Carthage by a heterodox and self-established "Team Europe" – considered by Giorgia Meloni as a great success of the Italian government, but also as a model for the relations with Africa, and endorsed at the same time by Ursula von der Leyen, seeking re-election as President of the European Commission, and by the outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte – not only is written in the sand because the European financial assistance to Tunisia is at least hypothetical for now, being conditioned by an even more hypothetical agreement with the IMF, but because it is based on the support to the internationally discredited Tunisian government and on the violent naval blockade of the Tunisian coast conducted by Matteo Piantedosi, Italian Minister of Interior Affairs, and his Tunisian colleague Kamel Fekih.

For now, no one in Brussels, in Strasbourg, in Vienna or in Warsaw or in Geneva – neither the Council, nor the European Parliament, nor the European Agency for Fundamental Rights, nor Frontex, nor UNHCR for Europe – has authorized or endorsed the memorandum of understanding, and indeed the European Parliament recently adopted a resolution in which the European policy in the Mediterranean is harshly condemned because in violation of international and European norms.

In these days, many non-governmental organizations are meeting in Tunis to condemn the European policies adopted in violation of human rights, and to denounce the violence of the Al-Saied regime, while

the Africa Counter Summit is taking place in Rome on the theme "*No deals on our skin*"¹, in parallel with the International Conference on Migration convened in Rome by the Italian government to consolidate and make more rigid the policy of blocking the flow of asylum seekers, in an unacceptable line of continuity with the bilateral agreements signed with Turkey, with Libya and now with Tunisia. At the same time, the Italian Association for Legal Studies on Immigration (ASGI) has released a text denouncing the memorandum of

understanding signed between the European Union and Tunisia.

The European Movement shares the condemnation and denunciation of the non-governmental organizations and asks the European Parliament to urge the European Commission to renounce the memorandum of understanding with Tunisia, in order to initiate a new phase of European migration policies based on human dignity and the respect for fundamental rights.

¹https://www.movimentoeuropeo.it/images/articoli/NO_AL_MEMORANDUM_CON_LA_TUNISIA_21.07.2023_ENG.pdf

Three Proposals for Safe and Legal Migration Routes to Europe

Appeal from the UEF

Background

14 June 2023 saw one of the deadliest shipwrecks reported in the Mediterranean, as a ship carrying around 750 migrants and asylum seekers trying to reach Europe capsized off the coast of Greece. More than 80 people died and 600 more are still missing at sea.

The Union of European Federalists (UEF) recalls that **saving lives must be the absolute priority of the European Union.** *“Our thoughts are to those who lost their lives and to their families. We call for coordinated support and full assistance to the survivors. In line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Union must guarantee the respect of Human Rights and international law, including the non-refoulement principle. We need now full clarity and transparency in the ongoing investigation by the Greek Authorities”,* said Sandro Gozi MEP, President of the UEF. The UEF calls for three concrete actions, ahead of the next European Summit meeting under the Swedish Presidency:

1. Firstly, a thorough, independent, and impartial investigation into the cause of this catastrophe to bring concrete answers to the pressing questions around the shipwreck: Why was a search and rescue operation not launched sooner? What are the causes of the ship capsizing? Those who lost their lives, survivors and their families deserve transparency, truth and justice.
2. Secondly, similarly to actions taken after the Lampedusa shipwreck 10 years ago, a

“Task Force Pylos” should be established. The Task Force will be in charge of identifying the current gaps and listing concrete measures needed for effective rights-based management of the EU’s external borders, and a sustainable EU asylum and migration policy. A stated objective of this Task Force should be the development and implementation of multipurpose maritime operations based on continuous cooperation of all relevant Agencies (FRONTEX, EFCA and EMSA) and national competent bodies.

3. Thirdly, a real policy change to develop a truly common EU Labour Migration policy, including thorough, bold and courageous Treaty changes. The changes should respond to the needs and economic interests of the Union. To fight effectively against the network of smugglers, it is urgent to reinforce and extend the EU’s cooperation with third countries, including cooperation in the area of justice and judicial investigation.

Ten years after the Lampedusa shipwreck, this new tragedy resurfaces the pending question concerning the European Union’s capacity to tackle migration and asylum challenges efficiently and humanely. Pylos demonstrates the extent of the challenge: preventing loss of lives by establishing safe and legal routes to Europe for people looking for protection. Despite the continuous efforts of the past ten years and the vast amount of money spent, basic elements of the EU asylum framework

(such as humanitarian visas or a system of mutual recognition of asylum decisions) are still missing.

Since 2019, the UEF has called for safe and legal ways to entry in Europe as the only way to avoid such frequently occurring tragedies in the Mediterranean. In the same spirit, the European Parliament has invited on several occasions the European Commission to table concrete legislative proposals on these issues. Yet, once again, we come to the brutal realisation that these goals have not been attained. The protection and saving of lives at the external borders should be the key priority in a

European integrated border management. The capacity and operational readiness to conduct effective search and rescue operations should be an important and integral part of the sea border surveillance operations at the external sea borders.

As the number of people drowning in the Mediterranean trying to reach safety in Europe rises, we cannot let Pylos be just another tragedy in a Union unconcerned with human suffering. Instead, let's work to build a safer and humane migration and asylum system. Only then will we be able to truly live up to the values our Union is founded upon.

(UEF Press Release - Brussels, 27 June 2023)

Vilnius NATO Summit: Unconditional Support for Ukraine Is Paramount to Protect Europe's Future

The UEF regrets NATO's failure to ensure a clear path for Ukraine's accession to the Alliance. The future of Europe is being decided on the Ukrainian battlefields. Should our neighbours fall to the Russian aggressor, the safety and well-being of all Europeans will be at risk.

The Union of European Federalists (UEF), in its February 2023 *Resolution on a Victorious Ukraine in a Federal Europe*¹, called for a new security architecture for Europe through the development of a Defense Union and overcoming unanimity votes on Foreign and Security Policies at the Council.

The NATO alliance will undeniably play a vital role in this security architecture we call for. For this reason, we ask the leaders of the Alliance to extend the invitation and offer Ukraine unconditional guarantees for accession once the war is over. In parallel to the country's accession to the European Union, the entrance of Ukraine to NATO will strengthen our

collective security.

At the occasion of the UEF's theme day on the Vilnius summit², UEF President Sandro Gozi said: *"as Federalists, we strongly support Ukraine's NATO membership. It is clear that Ukraine's future is in the EU and NATO. And granting NATO membership at the end of the war is the only way to safeguard Ukraine's independence in the long run and the overall security of the Atlantic Alliance, especially, of course, in our continent"*.

As the NATO Summit concludes without offering sufficient guarantees for Ukraine's accession, the UEF encourages the leaders of the Alliance to review their position at their next meeting, and reiterates its own unwavering support to the defending nation.

Anna Echterhoff
Secretary-General of the UEF
secretariat@federalists.eu

Brussels, 13 July 2023

¹ https://www.federalists.eu/fileadmin/files_uef/FC/FC_Brussels_February_2023/Resolutions_DEF/2_Proposal_of_resol_On_a_victorious_Ukraine_in_a_Federal_Europe_DEF.pdf

² <https://fb.watch/lKwqq1VtnO/>

UN Must Acknowledge Need of “Major Overhaul”, Civil Society Document Says

The *Coalition for the UN We Need*, an alliance of civil society groups advocating for a stronger UN, has released the outcomes¹ of an international conference, the Global Futures Forum², that was held in New York and online in March this year. The gathering brought together civil society representatives and experts to consider proposals to the UN as the world organization and its member governments are preparing for a series of conferences, the UN Summit on Sustainable Development in 2023, the Summit of the Future in 2024 and on Social Development in 2025.

Outcomes of the Global Futures Forum released

At a civil society round table convened this week in Berlin by the World Future Council³ in collaboration with a number of groups, among them *Democracy Without Borders*, the “Interim People’s Pact for the Future” was presented to a representative of the German foreign office. The document was further presented by *Democracy Without Borders’* Executive Director Andreas Bummel to the chair of the German Parliament’s subcommittee on UN affairs, Monika Grütters. Germany together with Namibia currently serves as a co-facilitator of the UN’s negotiations on the Summit of the Future.

The document outlines thirty-three recommendations and next steps across seven thematic fields related to the Sustainable Development Goals: environmental governance, human rights and participation, a global digital compact, the global economic and financial architecture, peace and security as well as innovating the UN and

global governance. According to a press release issued by the coalition, the proposals “are driven by five key objectives: a longer-term future orientation, global institutional reform, a whole of society approach, meeting existing commitments, and building trust.”

“The changes necessary may be at odds with the political landscape”, but the “urgency of the moment calls for a concrete reform of the multilateral system”, the introduction points out. As “conflicting priorities, unmet promises, and the erosion of trust” was hindering progress, governments need to “seize the rare opportunity” of the upcoming summits “to launch a process to create a renewed multilateral system”.

Numerous institutional reforms are suggested

Numerous institutional reforms are suggested in the “People’s Pact”. The creation of a “Global Resilience Council” is recommended “to ensure a more coherent and inclusive decision-making process”, with a view of “multi-dimensional global challenges like climate change, conflicts, and pandemics”. In the environmental realm, the establishment of “an Environmental Governance Agency with binding supranational authority to provide effective, integrated, equitable and accountable global governance of the Earth System” is put forward. In the field of finance, a new “International Anti-Corruption Court to tackle grand corruption and illicit financial flows” is supported.

The section on “UN and global governance innovation” endorses the “We The Peoples” campaign⁴ for inclusive global governance

and its three proposals: the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly⁵, a UN World Citizens' Initiative⁶ and a UN Civil Society Envoy. These suggestions aim at connecting the UN closer to citizens, their elected representatives and civil society, thus creating opportunities for their involvement and enhancing the organization's accountability. "A stronger UN also requires a more legitimate UN", the document says. In a next step, like-minded member states should form "a Group of Friends for Inclusive Global Governance" to investigate and move these ideas forward.

The need of a major overhaul should be acknowledged

According to the "People's Pact", the upcoming "Summit of the Future" should acknowledge the need of a major overhaul of the UN and global governance. For this purpose, a Charter

Review Conference, according to Article 109 of the UN Charter, should be convened". Such a review should include, among other things, a reform of the UN Security Council and an elimination of the veto power, empowering the UN General Assembly and upgrading the UN Parliamentary Assembly "from a subsidiary to a principal organ".

In the conclusion, it is pointed out that 2030 may be a "propitious time" to convene a UN Charter review conference. It is noted that this date "would give the international community sufficient time to conduct research and exploration, it would not overshadow the current objectives of the UN system, and it could help lay the foundations for whatever plans are to emerge after the Sustainable Development Goals". (*democracy without borders*)

The "Interim People's Pact for the Future" is available as a PDF at <https://c4unwn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Interim-Peoples-Pact-for-the-Future-Compressed.pdf>

¹ <https://c4unwn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Interim-Peoples-Pact-for-the-Future-Compressed.pdf>

² <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/26928/civil-society-forum-considers-proposals-for-global-change/>

³ <https://www.worldfuturecouncil.org/>

⁴ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/we-the-peoples/>

⁵ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/unpa-campaign/>

⁶ <https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/unwci-campaign/>

An Assessment of the Ongoing Validity of Kissinger's and Monnet's Schools of Thought

Ludovica Vecchio

Cesare Merlini

Geopolitica e interdipendenza. Le scuole di Henry Kissinger e Jean Monnet [in Italian]
Luca Sossella Editore, Roma, 2023

At a time when the world order as much as the world system are being questioned by the war in Ukraine, an analysis of the ongoing validity of *realpolitik* and of multilateralism is extremely pertinent. These two schools of thought are impersonated by Henry Kissinger and Jean Monnet respectively. In this book, the author explores them, after tracing a distinction between the words “order” and “system”: the former entailing a sort of hierarchy, the latter a “set of things connected”. The choice of the book cover further underlines this difference: on the front it is possible to see the painting of “The swearing of the oath of ratification of the Treaty of Münster 1648”, commonly known as the Westphalian Conference, by Gerard ter Borch; on the back, a picture of the European Parliament, taken in 2023. These two images aim to represent Kissinger, a neo-Westphalian nostalgic, and Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union (EU).

The book originates from the expansion of the article “*Kissinger and Monnet: Realpolitik and*

Interdependence in World Affairs” published by the author on the 65th volume of the journal *Survival* in February 2023. The book is divided into three parts. The first one is focused on reporting the biographical and ideological characteristics of Jean Monnet and Henry Kissinger. The author then proceeds onto evaluating the influences that have derived from their approaches, referring to international relations in general and subsequently to the war in Europe specifically. In the last two chapters, the author reflects on the crises and the metamorphoses undergone by the global society and on the future of international relations.

The attribution of the concept of *order* to Kissinger and of that of *system* to Monnet can be explained as follows: the former is one of the main supporters of the *realpolitik* approach; the latter played a crucial role in the creation of what became the EU. Within this framework, the author applies the approaches of Henry Kissinger and Jean Monnet to the recent and forthcoming developments of international relations. The main subject of this comparison is that of sovereignty, and more precisely of its divisibility and the subsequent possibility of its devolution to some supranational body. This perspective tends to be rejected by Kissinger, who asserts the integrity of State sovereignty in the name of *realpolitik*. Jean Monnet, on the other hand, is a strong supporter of a “functional” devolution that is limited to certain aspects of national sovereignty, be it strategic materials or economic policy.

At a time when global crises underline the progress the world has made in terms of States’ interdependence and the resulting weaknesses and when one of the ongoing tendencies is “the return of States”, the analysis carried out by the author in this book is compelling.

The analysis on the war in Europe is just as

opportune. It is interesting to note that the views of Kissinger as reported in this chapter have been later confirmed in his interview published by the *Economist* on the occasion of his 100th birthday (27 May 2023). On the other hand, when reporting the Monnetian view, the author resorts to the smart strategy of considering Monnet as present “in spirit”.

The author argues that the war in Ukraine has had the effect of confirming the ongoing relevance of *realpolitik*, embodied by Kissinger, but also its frailty as it promotes a world order that often degenerates into conflict. With regards to the “system” approach, the author reckons that, while it may have failed at the international level, it has not done so within the European Union. In particular, the author recalls one of Monnet’s most notorious quotes: “*Europe will be forged in crises*”. The war in Ukraine has indeed brought stronger unity among the Member States and has also rendered the EU more appealing to non-Member States, confirming the ongoing relevance of the quote and how Monnet can indeed be considered as present at least “in spirit”.

In his analysis, the author dedicates the second to last chapter to a reflection on the recent events that have shaped the world order as well as the world system. The crises recalled in the book include the 9/11 attack, Putin’s imperialism (which began in Crimea in 2014 to then reach the whole of Ukraine in 2022), Brexit, Trump’s election and COVID-19. The author also identifies three metamorphoses that the global society has undergone: climate change, women’s progressive emancipation and digitalisation. In this multi-centric and somehow chaotic world, which some compare to a “jungle”, one wonders “Where to from here?”. The author, without claiming to provide an exhaustive answer to this question, suggests some options in the last chapter. As it is often the case, the solution lies in the middle, in what I call a systemic order.

The author outlines a proposal comprising a combination of *realpolitik* and multilateralism, to be applied at least in the short term. While in the long term he reckons that the objective should be the progressive affirmation of the multilateral system over the “world order”, as the only means to face the ever-more-global challenges that humanity endures.

In conclusion, the federalist approach shall prevail in order to overcome and govern these difficulties through international cooperation and eventually through international democracy, applying the Monnetian ways to Kissingerian geopolitics.

Energy, a Destabilizing Factor

Adriana Castagnoli

Helen Thompson

Disorder. Hard Times in the 21st Century
Oxford University Press, 2022

Disorder, divided up in three topical historical accounts (geopolitical sphere, world economy and western democracies), retraces the history of the rivalry between the three current world powers, first of all the United States and Russia, all along the 20th century and the Cold War, up to the winter of 2019-2020, when the prospects of growth deteriorated in almost every country, China included. The world seemed to be at a turning point, and investors, under the pressure of the effects of climate change, started to abandon en masse the American and European oil companies and to invest in the green energy.

Much has been written on the last decade. Nationalism and populism, the great crisis of 2007-2008, and the decline of the liberal international order have been indicated as crucial and contextual factors of today's instability. Helen Thompson, professor of political economy at Cambridge, believes that it is to the structural changes in the balance between the big fossil-fuel producers that the world destabilization is to be ascribed. More precisely, it was the boom of the American shale, both gas and oil, propelled by the strength of the US financial power, that created the conditions for Washington to launch its challenge to the oil powers, Russia and Saudi Arabia. Both the strength points and the weakness points of the USA were to upset the Middle East and Europe, the most vulnerable areas, exposed to the contrary winds from the East and the Middle East.

When energy is the material base on which civilizations depend, the importance of the changes regarding its generation becomes evident. So far, economic development took place using ever increasing amounts of energy. Not even the hope in a different and sustainable energy future has reduced the relevant role of oil and gas. "At least at the moment, the attempt at an energy revolution depends entirely on the energy provisions of the fossil fuels it intends to replace, as well as on potentially scarce raw materials like the rare-earth metals".

Thompson shows how renewable energy actually increased the overall consumption of energy, rather than just replace that of fossil fuels. From 1995 – year of the first UN Summit on climate – the primary consumption of coal increased by more than two-thirds, that of oil by more than one-third, and that of gas by more than four-fifths.

At the center of the present offer of sustainable

energy there is an attempt at changing the long-time relation between fossil energy and economic development, adopting new cutting-edge technologies. Such structural transformation exposes politics to some risks, both at the international and the domestic levels, because it is the venue of last resort of the current collective conflicts, material and cultural. Both the biosphere and the use of energy impose limitations, although human beings must try to overcome them. There are limits also for democracies as for any body in the political realm. The present decade could appear impossible to understand if the role of green energy is not taken into account.

In order to contain specific situations that the energy revolution will generate and make worse, governments shall decide which concomitant risks have to be taken in relation to different temporal scales. Such decisions, the author anticipates, will imply geopolitical conflicts also in the territory where the critical resources are located. In western democracies, politicians shall make "appealing" to the citizens the probable sacrifices that will be requested. How the democracies can be sustained when the foreseeable conflicts on climate change and on energy consumption will destabilize them, will become the key political question of the next years.

Even if at the level of energy geo-economy *Disorder* offers elements of judgment and knowledge, at the level of historical and political analysis it is less effective. Inter alia, Thompson takes for granted a concept like Eurasia that she uses in many passages with implications that go beyond the mere geographical expression. Sentences like "As Eurasia takes an overt post-imperial economic form, the effects of a development in any part of the world's one supercontinent reverberate across it" certainly leave the reader baffled. Is the Russia that invaded Ukraine post-imperial?

The point is that Eurasia, beside being a geographic expression, is a controversial category with clear geopolitical, cultural and ethnical implications, which are referred to in the first place in the imperial vision of autocrats, although quite different from each other, like Putin and Erdogan.

It is well-known that the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin has theorized the new imperial future of Russia exactly adapting the concept of Eurasia to his current presumed opposers, Europe and the world under the leadership of the USA. His neo-Eurasianism is not anti-imperial, but the contrary: Russia has always been an Empire and, according to his hopes, in the next phase of “global fighting” may become a “worldwide Empire”.

Piketty on Creating a Just Society in the US and Europe

Joseph Preston Baratta

Thomas Piketty

Capital and Ideology (Arthur Goldhammer, trans.)
Belknap Press of Harvard University,
Cambridge, MA, 2020

This review follows my earlier one on the European Union in this review's July 2023 issue.

Thomas Piketty's *Capital and Ideology* offers guidance to civil society groups seeking world peace, such as Democracy Without Borders, the World Federalist Movement, the more universal wing of the Union of European Federalists, and concerned individuals. The book traces the

deep, economic history of inequality, despite gains such as the abolition of feudalism (4 August 1789) or the elevation of men (and eventually women) to equal citizenship in new republics, which should be helpful to meet the next challenges of hyper-capitalism and Chinese Communism. Since the Reagan and Thatcher reversals in the 1980s, there has been a great increase of inequality for the lower 90 percent of the population in every nation, which Piketty particularly traces. He does have a vision of ultimate “transnational participatory socialism and social federalism”, but he is not trying to persuade us simply to adopt it. Rather, he shows us what actions to take in the struggle of ideologies (nowadays, meritocracy vs. social ownership) to bring it about, mostly by allying with the working and middle classes in their struggles for equality since the times of progressivism (1890-1916). “Nothing is predetermined,” he often says. Everything depends on public debate, constitutional and legislative struggles, and experiment.

“History has much to teach us”, he writes, “about the shape of an ideal property or tax regime or educational system.” Piketty shows how the era of absolute private property culminating in the Belle Époque, Edwardian Age, and Gilded Age, was undone during the Great War, Depression, and World War II by progressive taxation on incomes (1913 in the U.S., 1914-17 in France) and inheritances (1916, 1901). These taxes (reaching 70-80 percent) were the result of political decisions in times of war and depression to pay for victory, nationalizations, public education, and health. The Bolshevik revolution attempted to completely abolish private property, especially in land and industry, but other states in the West were content with more modest reforms like the New Deal, the Beveridge plan, *la Sécurité sociale*, and Swedish-German co-management. Franklin Roosevelt's proposed Economic Bill of Rights (1944) was typical. Piketty calls the welfare states after 1945 “social democratic”: not Communist but

definitely Leftist, the most socially equitable as well as most prosperous, as measured by economic growth (1945-1980). This last is his standard. It came about not through design, but by struggles for equality and social justice in times of crisis against forces, always at work in societies, of privilege and selfishness.

That era ended with the innovations of the 1980s: neoliberalism, free market capitalism, and globalization. In the U.S. it was a response to stagflation in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which the American people could not be induced to pay for by taxation. In Europe, the privileged classes seized the opportunities for trade opened up by the Americans. Piketty devotes most of his book to how the entrepreneurial class was freed from capital controls to exploit the poor and foreign peoples for gain, which produced the deeply inequalitarian societies in the West today. Unregulated capitalism was a principal cause of the disasters of 1914-1945, and its revival under globalization led to the financial crisis of 2008.

Piketty blames the loss of further progress toward social democracy on failures of the parties on the Left: in France, Socialist, Communist, Radical, and Green; in Britain, Labour; in America, Democratic; in Germany, Social Democratic (SPD); in Sweden, Social Democratic (SAP). These workers' parties became, thanks to the expansion of public education after the war, elite parties of the educated. The working class felt abandoned and drifted toward the "sirens of racism and anti-immigration", what he calls "identitarian" (nationalist) politics.

Their greatest failure, he argues, was the "inability of the social-democratic coalitions to escape the nation-state". Both Hannah Arendt and Friedrich von Hayek have criticized the socialists for not pursuing a federation [pp. 479-85]. The EU is the most immediate example of modern states failing to federate. Moreover, the "disasters of Stalinism and Maoism" have made

many on the Left doubt the very possibility of egalitarian internationalist solutions. It is possible that the elite parties of the educated may cooperate, but their policies are instantly perceived by the immense majority of the working class and increasingly of the middle class, as principally benefiting the upper deciles of the population. In the American context, those trying to turn the elite parties around include Henry George, Huey Long, Bernie Sanders, Elisabeth Warren, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. They believe in justice for all. Liberty as an ideology is complemented by equality.

Piketty does not argue that we should simply take from the rich and give to the poor. He argues that it is possible to create a just society with prosperity and liberty for all. He concludes with a stunning vision of social democratic objectives:

- Power sharing between workers and shareholders;
- Ceiling on corporate shareholder votes;
- Steeply progressive taxes on income, inheritances, and wealth;
- Universal capital endowment;
- Permanent circulation of wealth;
- Social insurance;
- Basic income;
- Ecological transition;
- Educational equality;
- Co-development treaties;
- Quantified objectives of social, fiscal, and environmental justice;
- Liberalization of trade;
- Abandonment of some treaties permitting the free circulation of capital;
- Rules of financial transparency, fiscal cooperation, and transnational democracy.

For activist groups, the lesson would be that success ultimately depends on the utter rebuilding of the working-class political parties dedicated to the goal of social democracy.

The EU Seen from the Inside by a Federalist Journalist

Catherine Vieilledent

Bernard Guetta

La nation européenne [in French]

Flammarion, Paris, 2023

With this title, Bernard Guetta does not beat about the bush: the European nation does exist and it is making its way towards a political Europe, the third moment in its history. One year before the 2024 elections, this is an interesting and enthusiastic testimony of a semi outsider, newly elected to the European Parliament in 2019 (Renew list), where he recounts his first steps, his bedazzlements, his disappointments and ill-contained impatience. Because you do not become MEP in one day, as he explains, even for a journalist specializing in international relations and geopolitics: from opinion to consensus, it takes a full mandate for these MEPs to understand the workings of the machine, as they were sent to Brussels by national parties as “troublemakers” too intelligent or too well known to be sidelined from politics altogether. A word of caution to party apparatuses: do not spoil too quickly the skills acquired for the sake of internal political games and career management, as you often do!

This personal and committed narrative retraces the journey of resized ambitions, the difficult learning process of building a collective object, for example by renouncing a project that is close to his heart since 2019: passing a resolution by the European Parliament on an appeal to the Russian people, that is to say, to prepare for the

future by addressing the Russians directly, over Putin’s head. The project did not succeed, but resulted in the publication of a call at the end of 2020 in the press of several countries. The three main political groups will finally sign up (the call is reproduced in the book). Another example: the Parliament was debating whom to grant the Sakharov Prize to among the oppressed minorities and martyred peoples of the world. Guetta recounts the laborious struggle, with unlikely alliances and shadow maneuvers, which eventually imposed the cause of the Uighurs. The price to be paid is that, often, one must yield to internal rituals, to institutional rivalries, to petty wrangling, to national conformisms.

Interestingly, the book analyses the European turnaround, especially among the members of Central and Nordic Europe, on the perception of France, suspected of visceral anti-Americanism and, above all, suspected of plotting, with the Germans, an alliance with the Russians at their expense. Until the turn of 2016, when Trump was elected and Brexit was voted by the British people, and Europe found itself naked in the face of the threats from the East, with growing chaos on its southern flank, abandoned by its Atlantic allies. B. Guetta argues that during his meetings and exchanges in Poland and the Baltic countries, he found that the cause of a European defence was finally accepted. He sees it as the victory of the French approach and a first step towards the European mission whose vision he attributes to France and Germany: build the stability and prosperity of the Continent by ensuring respect for borders and the independence of countries.

Back to recent breaks, such as the suspension of the Maastricht criteria due to the Covid crisis, and the Council’s agreement to launch a large common loan to finance large-scale investment plans. B. Guetta celebrates these accelerations where he sees the capacity of the European Union to adapt and react to crises, outside the Treaties and even in disregard of inter-institutional relations. His only regret is

that the opportunity was missed, in particular by the European Parliament, frustrated by its exclusion, to highlight this major step forward in the European project towards financial autonomy. But the time has not yet come, he thinks, to lower the role of the Heads of state and government and to equalise powers between the two chambers (Council and Parliament), because the citizens have a profound need to feel assured by their own state, and membership of the Union, as it is now, is very much desired by other states.

There was a similar parliamentary frustration in 2019 at the failure of the *Spitzenkandidaten* process, which would make the leader of the leading list in the European elections the future President of the Commission. Guetta expresses his incomprehension of the institution, although openly federalist and convinced of the imperfect character of European democracy and the urgency to remedy it. However, he notes that the states remain the absolute masters of the European project (with a cost: opaque and uncomprehensible supreme decision-making mechanisms). And he admits the need to move forward in small steps, through concrete achievements pending the federalization of the institutions, and therefore accepts the status quo which leaves strategic choices only to the national leaders, whereas the European Parliament, for the most part, has a capacity for amendment, obstruction, etc.

Bernard Guetta notes the great lie of the Eurosceptics, who accuse Brussels of imposing its dictates, while in reality strategic decisions are taken, precisely, by national leaders by consensus. But the time, according to him, is not for institutional reforms. Rather, in view of the 2024 elections, he proposes the establishment of pan-European programmes to pave the way to a great political debate in the unity of place and time of the campaign (elections will be held between 6 and 9 June 2024, depending on the countries, things could have been worse...), favouring

coalitions of ideas that would place the European Parliament at the centre of the game. It is in these terms that Bernard Guetta calls for a great political recomposition, on one side a regrouping of pro-European democrats and progressives, with the contribution of the liberal centre and the Greens, and on the other the supporters of conservative and identity sovereigntism.

Among the perspectives that the book opens, is the idea to make a multi-speed Europe, multiplying enhanced cooperations, and then to institutionalize three concentric circles: a European Partnership with the Balkans, Ukraine, a democratized Turkey or even the United Kingdom around the internal market, the principles of the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights; the current Economic and Monetary Union, without fiscal and social dumping; and finally a European Community united by the common foreign and security policy, defence and an industrial policy.

The book ends with the post-war vision of Ukraine, and the call to rebuild the relationship with Russia, a work of reconciliation that will no doubt be as difficult as it was after 1945, especially for Poland and the Baltic countries. But post-war management, writes Bernard Guetta, unlike after the fall of the wall, must build security agreements binding all the states on the continent in order to guarantee a lasting peace in Europe. We must therefore offer reconciliation, cooperation and peace to Russia, avoiding the break-up of the Federation and the resulting bloody anarchy. In order to rule out any imperial and nationalist nostalgia, not only in Russia, and resume the construction of the 'common European home'.

One may not always be convinced by certain geopolitical reflections of Bernard Guetta, but what he proposes for Europe, the ambition to be "the indispensable balancing power between China and the United States", deserves to be listened to.

Ernesto Rossi: a Life for European Federalism*

Raymond Krakovitch

Ernesto Rossi

L'Europe de demain et autres écrits fédéralistes (1944-1948) – La Nation dans le monde – Socialisme et fédéralisme [in French]

Introduction by Antonella Braga

Presse fédéraliste, Lyon, 2022

Ernesto Rossi (1897-1967) was a very young anti-fascist and paid for his energy in this struggle with nine years in prison in Italy, from 1930 to 1939, from where he delivered a detailed analysis of the crisis of democracy and of European civilization. The ideas of a European federation germinated during these years.

Arrived in Switzerland in 1943, he immediately made contact with the representatives of the Italian resistance and the leaders of the American and British information services, even though they did not facilitate the project of European unity to which he was so attached. For him, a European federalism had to be conceived and developed before the end of the war.

He writes a lot about this. He argues against the absolute sovereignty of states, for a Franco-German reconciliation, for including Great Britain in a European project that the USSR was not in a position to integrate.

Rossi indeed considers that European

federalism must be a form of liberal socialism, without waiting for an improbable unity of the socialist countries. In the spring of 1944, he organized meetings between the European Resistance movements, the conclusion of which was the promise of considering the national problems as particular aspects of the European problem as a whole, in order to be prepared, at the end of the war, to deal with the construction of the United States of Europe.

He is convinced that the battle will be won or lost, in the immediate post-war period between the armistice and the signing of the peace treaty. Indeed, once the horrors of the war were forgotten and the national frameworks reconstituted, the construction of the European Federation would become uncertain, if not impossible.

Hopes and disappointments

Rossi's hopes will not be realized and the dogma of absolute sovereignty of States will remain unquestioned for a long time. His lucid initiatives will be counterbalanced by errors about the evolution of minds. He fell back, for lack of anything better, on supporting the Marshall Plan in 1947, preferring to consolidate democracy rather than advocating an illusory socialism. The confederation projects, such as the CECA in 1950 or the CED in 1952, were better than nothing but were only the flavor of the roast, which could only come from a federation.

For Rossi, federalism is the translation in modern terms of internationalism. There is no point in waiting for socialism to be established in all countries, which can only be a figment of the imagination. He will constantly insist with this credo.

The works that *Presse fédéraliste* is publishing are very comprehensive. They include seminal texts published in the post-war years, such as

“The Europe of Tomorrow”, edited in 1945 by the Action Center for European Federation, and an extract from “The Nation in the World” published in the same year in collaboration with the YMCA in Bern, which insists on the distinction between nationality and nationalism. This text demonstrates that the principle of national sovereignty, which is only a facade for small countries, becomes, in the relations between great powers, an outright “law of the jungle”.

In the 1950s Rossi would be one of the founders of the Italian Radical Party, continuing his fight until his death.

* Article published in the monthly *L'Ours*, in May 2023

Democratism as a New Research Paradigm?

Hans Leander

Hans Agné

*Democratism: Explaining International Politics
with Democracy Beyond the State*
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2022

For those who strive to make global politics more democratic and inclusive, there are several academic works that serve as helpful resources. Authors such as Andreas Bummel, Oded Gilad, Dena Freeman, David Held, Daniele Archibugi, Luis Cabrera, and Augusto Lopez-Claros have made significant contributions. More could surely be mentioned. The common denominator for these works is

a normative claim that international politics ought to be democratized so that global threats and challenges could be dealt with in a more responsible manner.

Although the reviewed work joins in this research agenda, it also differs in its approach. Rather than making a normative claim, it makes use of *democracy beyond the state* as an analytical concept aimed at explaining global and international politics as is, and poses a question that embraces the whole discipline of International Relations (IR): “what does a territorially expanded concept of democracy mean for the problem of explaining political issues of global and international study?”

Agné calls this approach *Democratism*, which is defined as “an approach to global and international politics in positive and empirical terms from the perspective of democracy beyond the state”.

Contrary to what could be expected, democracy in global and international politics has been largely neglected in research to explain outcomes. In IR, research on democracy is typically limited to the domestic politics of individual states. For Agné, this is stunning and motivates his attempt to launch democratism as a new research paradigm. Considering its potential, it is an important undertaking.

The book has four parts. In the first part the concept of *democracy beyond the state* is defined. The second part discusses why elements of *democracy beyond the state* may be expected to influence a broad range of phenomena in global and international politics, thereby generating new explanations and predictions of international political processes. In the third part the concept is tested on a range of empirical cases to explain empirical observations, examining the usefulness of the theory. Part 4 discusses the potential of

democratism as a new research paradigm in IR, comparable to liberalism, realism, Marxism, and constructivism.

The work tests 25 hypotheses covering a wide range of issues, and space does not allow to render them all. One example that shows how the concept can be used concerns the decline in international wars from 1945 to 2010. According to hypothesis 5.1, “the declines in violent conflict were preceded by increases in democracy in global politics”. There is a correlation, Agné shows, between the decline in interstate wars and battle-deaths during this period, and gradually higher levels of democracy in global politics.

Is the work helpful for activists? Yes and no. The work clearly has an academic purpose, and its language is rather theoretical and dense, expecting the reader to be familiar with IR terminology. On the other hand, it offers sound arguments. Research with this approach has a potential for explaining why *democracy beyond the state* is worth striving for. In addition, students that are trained in democratism will arguably be more interested in promoting it.

The Occitans: a People in Search of a New Federal Democracy

Giampiero Bordino

Gérard Tautil

Contretemps. Lettres sur l'Occitanie et l'occitanisme [in French]

Presse fédéraliste, Lyon, 2022

This essay, in a bilingual edition (French and Occitan, the first book printed in this language) explores the theme of Occitan identity, in cultural and linguistic terms, in the French, European and global context. The Author, philosopher and teacher of Occitan language and culture, poses from the beginning the fundamental question that always emerges in the relationship between different identities: how to make diversities coexist peacefully and profitably, how to think and build the complexity of plural identities and belongings? In modern and contemporary history, identity-based nationalism, “embodied” in the power system of centralized states, has repeatedly produced conflicts, repression, real human tragedies that have marked the lives of millions of people. A single identity, a single belonging, a single citizenship: nationalist “monism”, exclusive and excluding, also pursued through the use of the “legitimate force” of the State, has weighed on the lives of people and communities, often determining their destinies. All this occurred in the context of the triumph of market interests, of financial globalization, of the “victory of the forces of money”, of the crisis of social and environmental protection systems, of

repressive policies against minorities, of the rejection of migratory processes.

“Macronism” in France, according to the Author, is essentially “the marriage of private interests and political calculations at the service of [the French] central power”. A process of “institutional metropolitanization” has occurred in the country, to the detriment of minorities, of peoples “transversal” to different territorial states (such as the Occitans, historically present with their cultural traditions and their language in France, Italy and Spain), of the suburbs, of marginal social groups. In France, in recent years, the recurrent and pervasive phenomenon of the “*gilets jaunes*” revolt has been and is at the same time an outcome and a sign of this phenomenon. The revolt derives from three fundamental fractures, intertwined with each other: social (growing differences in income, wealth, etc.), territorial (marginalization of peripheral and rural territories, etc.), political (decline of intermediate social bodies, crisis of representation, etc.). Millions of people, so to speak “misplaced”, no longer recognize themselves in the social and institutional contexts in which they live, have lost the feeling of belonging which has always contributed decisively to the legitimation of political power and increasingly perceive social revolt, pervasive and indistinct (“we rebel, therefore we are”, beyond any specific objective and problem), as the only possible form for building

their identity and defending their interests.

What can be opposed to this reality and this perspective to avoid harmful outcomes? How can a new form of statehood, a new Europe of peoples, a new world be built? What is, as the Author writes, “the future form of democracy we are calling for”? This form is the Federal Republic in a federal Europe, and in a federal world, according to the perspective “from local to global”. The same perspective, essentially, that a great French and European intellectual, Albert Camus, had already outlined in his time, in reference to Algeria, where he was born, to France, of which he was a citizen, and to Europe, which, due most of all to his experience of the World War and the Resistance, had become for him a new “homeland”. Algeria federated to France, France federated to Europe, Europe federated to the world: Camus’ grand dream, made impossible once again by the prevalence of identity-based nationalism.

Along this path there is also the intention to prevent that the neo-liberist democracy of recent decades, born in the context of the economic and financial globalization process, transform itself into a form of “illiberal democracy”, following an authoritarian model that is increasingly widespread in the world. Federal democracy, and therefore recognition of the autonomy of different peoples and different territories, and liberal democracy, live and die together.

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