Year XXXVII, Number 3, November 2024

Sara Bertolli, Simone Cantarini and Roberto Castaldi
Sara Bertolli is President of JEF-Italy and news editor of Euractiv.it; Simone Cantarini is Chief editor at Euractiv.it;
Roberto Castaldi is Associate Professor of Political Philosophy, Director of the Research Centre
on Multi-Level Integration and Governance Processes at eCampus University

The European Union must "do more" to ensure its defense and economic security including the development of a defense industrial base, including with common forms of debt. This is according to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union and Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, in an interview with Euractiv Italia conducted as part of the 43^rd Ventotene Training Seminar, organized by the Altiero Spinelli Institute.

The EU diplomacy chief takes stock five years after the "Geopolitical Commission" announced by Ursula von der Leyen, analyzing the main challenges ahead for the EU. In the interview, Borrell claims the progress and unity shown by the EU in supporting Ukraine, stressing that he does not see the possibility of "a peace agreement with Putin's Russia in the immediate future."

In the interview Borrell also addresses the sensitive issue of relations with China, noting that "despite the lucid and realistic assessment of the past five years, the EU remains firmly committed to continuing dialogue" with Beijing.

Finally, the High Representative also addresses the issue of reforming the EU Treaties, which is seen as increasingly necessary to ensure effective joint action, especially in foreign and defense policy. Borrell stresses how the current system, based on unanimity, represents today with a union of 27 countries "a huge obstacle," noting that at 37 "it will simply be unsustainable." For the High Representative, while "difficult, uncertain and politically controversial," treaty reform will also be "inevitable in the medium term," as "the status quo is unacceptable."

Below is the text of the full interview with Josep Borrell.

In 2019, Ursula von der Leyen promised a "Geopolitical Commission." Five years later, the EU is still perceived as weak on foreign and security policy, unable to be a mediator in Ukraine or Palestine. What is your assessment of the improvements made and the challenges facing the next Vice President/High Representative Kaja Kallas?

The cases of Ukraine and Palestine are very different. On Gaza, it is true, it has been much more difficult to act united, even historically [as my predecessor Federica Mogherini experienced]. In Ukraine, we act with great unity, and our role is not as a mediator, at least until Putin is willing to stop his aggression and open negotiations in good faith but to support the Ukrainians in their right to self-defense. We provide arms and financial assistance; we passed 14 sanctions packages on Russia. Overall, I think in these five years we have strengthened our geopolitical profile and our position as a security provider. We now provide substantial military support to our partners through the European Peace Facility. We have made progress toward a common security and defense strategy with the Strategic Compass. We are working to operationalize the rapid deployment capability of 5,000 soldiers.

The EU is Israel's largest trading partner and Palestine's largest donor. How much do member states' divisions over the Middle East affect the EU's ability to play a role?

We must be more united on this issue because Israel's right to self-defense cannot be subject to any exception to the principles of proportionality and full compliance with International Law, including Humanitarian Law. There is an urgent need to stop the killing of civilians and the humanitarian disaster, the spread of diseases (polio), with a permanent cease-fire, which must also lead to the overdue release of the more than one hundred Israeli citizens still imprisoned, and to relaunch the peace process. On this we have a clear and unanimous EU common position. Because Israeli settlements are illegal under international law and seriously erode the very possibility of the two-state solution, we have already adopted the first sanctions against several violent settlers in the occupied West Bank. Over the summer, I proposed sanctions against two Israeli ministers considering their messages of hatred and incitement to war crimes, and the creation of a new sanctions regime for those who act against peace. We discussed this issue among EU foreign ministers at the informal meeting on August 29. We could not make a decision as it was an informal meeting, but the exchanges were fruitful and many colleagues – beyond the usual divisions – saw the merits of this move. As always, the decision requires unanimity, and the proposal is now being discussed by Council working groups.

What are the differences between US presidential candidates Harris and Trump in foreign policy priorities and transatlantic relations?

It is obvious that there are significant differences between the two candidates when it comes to foreign policy; clearly on Ukraine, multilateralism, climate change, and NATO. Obviously, a future Harris administration would be much more in line with current EU policy. That said, both U.S. parties are extremely focused on China. We will see what happens in the elections; it is really not in our hands. We need to do more to ensure our defense and economic security, including the development of our defense industrial base.

What are the prospects for EU-China relations? Could the results of the U.S. presidential election affect this dossier as well?

For us, the main geopolitical concern and threat is Russia. Despite the lucid and realistic assessment of the past five years, the EU remains firmly committed to continuing dialogue with China, both to explain and dispel differences and to seek strands of constructive joint work. Undoubtedly, our political systems are different, and, in this regard, there are ideological rivalries and concerns about human rights abuses and violations. Moreover, China is an economic competitor for the EU, but also a partner.

Future relations with China will also depend on how it conducts itself in the Ukrainian conflict. China's support for the Russian-led war has consequences for EU-China relations, therefore, we want to actively engage with China to discourage greater alignment with Moscow.

Trade and technology tensions between the U.S. and China also have very negative consequences for Europe, because China is trying to export to the EU products made from the huge overcapacities accumulated in China's manufacturing sector. We are trying to avoid a trade war with China, but we also have to defend our industries. We have already taken measures regarding solar panels and electric vehicles. However, we do not want to decouple our economies or stop cooperating with the Chinese on global governance, low-income countries' debt, and climate change.

Is there any chance that EU-RUSSIA relations will be restored in case there is a peace agreement and Putin is still in power? Can the EU talk to Putin again and trust his word?

I do not see a peace agreement with Putin's Russia in the immediate future. Putin is making it clear that he maintains his maximalist demands: conquest of Ukraine and subjugation of the Ukrainian people, and perhaps he has other ambitions beyond Ukraine (he seems increasingly obsessed with restoring the Russian empire as his main legacy). Moreover, Putin himself and some members of his circle have been indicted by the International Criminal Court for serious war crimes and crimes against humanity. It is important that Russia be held accountable for its actions in Ukraine.  Its track record in negotiations is also well known. The Russian power system sees itself at war with the "West" and "Europe." In the distant future, in a post-conflict environment, there may be changes in relations with Russia, but the fact remains that the war is likely to continue and there is unlikely to be business as usual under these circumstances, which are red lines for us as the EU.

What was the role of Nord Stream 2 sabotage in the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine? Is it possible for the pipeline to return to operation in the future?

Nord Stream 2 was never operational, and I don't see any particular relation to the invasion of Ukraine. It is being investigated, there is too much speculation about what happened. I think this project was unnecessary and geopolitically wrong with respect to European interests (diversification of energy sources), the Commission has been clear on that.

The EU is surrounded by geopolitical crises. EU member states' military expenditures are a total of 45 percent of those of the United States but with an effective capacity of 10 percent. Moreover, member states are trying to increase them. What are the prospects for integration in foreign policy and defense?

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, we had decades of silent disarmament. The war in Ukraine showed that we were in a dangerous situation in terms of our defense capabilities. We reacted strongly, and our European defense spending is expected to reach almost 2 percent of our GDP this year, the NATO threshold. But we still need to cooperate much more closely, particularly on our equipment, to fill critical capability gaps, avoid duplication, and address interoperability problems. We currently buy only 18 percent of our equipment in cooperation, while we want to reach 40 percent in 2030. We also need to strengthen our defense industry. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, 80% of the equipment purchased by our armies has come from third countries. To strengthen our defense readiness and the European defense technology industrial base, I launched together with Commissioner (Thierry) Breton the European Defense Industrial Strategy.  To be successful, we will have to be able to mobilize sufficient financial resources at the European level. To this end, I have advocated a new joint debt issue.

How can we get to a European defense, even as a European pillar of NATO? And how can we finance it?

We all agree on building a strong European defense pillar within NATO, but we need to define more precisely what it means, how it is managed and articulated with EU defense structures and policies. We need to strengthen European capabilities and resilience to strengthen the European pillar in NATO. The rapid deployment capability will also help improve interoperability, which will benefit NATO and its deterrence capability. The threats we face are complex and include threats in space, cyberspace, terrorism, hybrid attacks, and disinformation. The EU and NATO have different tools at their disposal and we need to use both. We must work closely together to get the most out of limited resources and consider issues of overall planning and force deployment.

As mentioned above, security is a European public good. We should finance it together with green and digital transitions, issuing a common debt as we did to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, provided we agree on new own resources to repay the debt.

Does this require treaty change and/or multi-speed/differentiated integration?

There are still unused options in the Lisbon Treaty, such as passerelles to activate qualified majority voting, but some reforms will still be necessary. As I said in my speech at the 43rd Ventotene Seminar, we need a more federal EU. This means, at the very least, Parliament also voting on debt and taxation and overcoming the veto in the Council. Unanimity at 27 is already a huge obstacle; at 37 it will simply be untenable. I know that treaty reform is difficult, uncertain and politically controversial, but also inevitable in the medium term. The status quo is unacceptable.

* Article originally published in Italian by Euractiv.it  Translated in English by TFD editorial staff.