Year XXXVIII, Number 1, March 2025

Marc Lazar
 Professor emeritus of history and political sociology and holder of the BNP-BNL-Paribas Chair,
“Franco-Italian Relations for Europe” at the Luiss University of Rome. Member of the UEF Scientific Council. 

The notion of national populism applies to parties that are both nationalist and populist. Their nationalism is defensive, rather than conquering as in the past. In each country, however, this translates into an exaltation of the nation's past, a defence of its present heritage and a call to make it prosperous in the future. Their populism consists of the more or less well-structured ideology which they invoke, according to which there is a fundamental opposition between a supposedly united, good and virtuous people and a homogeneous ruling class that dominates and constantly plots against them. For them, populism also manifests itself in the use of a demagogic, simplistic and disruptive political style which serve the political agenda of a strategy of conquest and the exercise of power. There are left-wing and right-wing national-populists, but the latter are the most prominent in Europe, which justifies taking a closer look at them.  

For right-wing national-populists  -such as Rassemblement National, Reconquête, Vox in Spain, Fratelli d'Italia, Lega, also in Italy, AfD in Germany, Fidesz in Hungary, Law and Justice in Poland, the Swedish Democrats, the Freedom Party in the Netherlands and the Freedom Party in Austria- the nation is fundamentally an ethno-cultural concept: we belong to  the nation because we have blood ties through our line of descent and have a common heritage. As for the people, they are above all, in the words of these parties, “folk”, “disenfranchised”, “little people”, “humble people”, full of “common sense” words which these parties intend to translate into politics and people whom they claim to embody and to whom they want to give a voice. For they claim to be the best of democrats, because they listen to the people and promote their sovereignty, which accepts no bounds.

What characterizes right-wing populism today is both its strength and its limitations. Its strength is obvious, as we saw at the last European elections: in total, they won 271 seats compared to 141 in 2019. They have made real progress even if it has been a little less strong than they themselves had hoped, with marked differences between Western Europe and the central-eastern part, where they have achieved good results. They are enjoying a favourable dynamic because they have succeeded in putting their policies at the heart of the political agenda, notably immigration, security, the denunciation of Islam, the rejection of the Green Pact and criticism of the European Union.

Of course, they have given up the idea of leaving the European Union and abandoning the single currency for operations in the Eurozone member states. However, they intend to influence the direction of European policy and change the EU from within. The European People's Party (EPP) in the European Parliament has already adopted some of their proposals. What is more, the ideas of these parties are spreading to a large part of public opinion. Their voters no longer vote for them purely out of protest against the politicians they increasingly distrust, against the EU they accuse of all evis, or to express their deep and real social malaise, but out of conviction. 

However, the rise of these parties is not irresistible. In fact, they are divided. In the European Parliament, they are split into three groups: the “Patriots”, dominated by the Rassemblement National and Viktor Orbán's FIDES, among others, has 84 MEPs, while the “European Conservatives and Reformists” group, with Georgia Meloni's Fratelli d'Italia party, has 78 MEPs. Finally, the “Europe of Sovereign Nations” group, which includes the German AfD, is the third largest. They disagree on Russia and the war in Ukraine and are split between the pro-Russians, including Fidesz, and those who support Ukraine, such as Fratelli d'Italia. They all see Islam as a danger, but some, like Viktor Orbán and Giorgia Meloni, explain that it is all about defending Christian civilization, while Marine Le Pen sets herself up as a defender of the Republic and secularism. On economic matters they are divided between neoliberals and the parties more inclined to defend the welfare state, provided it is reserved for nationals of the various countries. Finally, as each party seeks to promote the interests of its own country, this is often an obstacle to their unity of action. For example, Fratelli d'Italia is calling for a re-distribution of migrants that Fidesz and the RN refuse to agree to.

Now a new phase has begun.  Paris and Berlin are weakened, and Donald Trump will take office in the White House on January 20. Budapest and Rome are trying to take advantage of the situation, and here again, they converge and diverge at the same time. Viktor Orbán, a source of inspiration for American Republicans, would like to be the new administration's main contact person, while blocking the progress of European political integration. Giorgia Meloni is still hesitant about whether to align herself with the Hungarian Prime Minister, to whom she is currently very close or to fully engage in a different direction that she has started to explore. Indeed, having forged excellent links with Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber, president of the EPP, she could act to shift European politics to the right and become the preferred point of reference for Donald Trump and his great personal friend Elon Musk. In any case, Europe's populist nationalist s are on the offensive, and in part determine the future of the EU. It is therefore essential for genuinely pro-European parties not only to understand the extent of the challenge posed by these parties, but also do what is needed to embark upon a new dynamic for building Europe.