An Absolute Leader for a New Era

Adriana Castagnoli
Historian and economist, she is a columnist for "Il Sole 24 Ore". She investigates geopolitical and economic relations at a global level. She has taught Contemporary and Economic History at the University of Turin. Her most recent publications include Il lungo addio.

As long as Beijing's goal has been economic development, reformers' policies and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s goals coincided. But since President Xi Jinping decided to have an economy less susceptible to American pressure, party control has prevailed. In an economy where the chain of command matters, it falls to loyal and competent executives to implement the leader's vision.

Moreover, the omission of any mention in his report to the 20th CCP Congress of strategic opportunities for the country, as well as peace and development, has exposed his anxieties about an increasingly volatile world, in which Washington is contesting the rise of China as an authoritarian superpower.

Xi's grim warning of "dangerous storms" on the horizon indicates that he believes that international risks have worsened, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine in February. The party chief sees a world made more treacherous by the US support for the disputed island of Taiwan. China's vulnerability is made more acute by its own technological bottlenecks and the Western-led alliance plans to increase the US military presence throughout Asia.

Faced with this scenario of a likely escalation of conflict, Xi has created the premises to integrate the Politburo with officials he believes will support his call to "struggle" with their loyalty to him and the party, and their ability to expedite programs to upgrade high technology, military modernization and social controls.

In particular, young people, whose unemployment rate has never been higher, are a concern for both the commanders of the People's Liberation Army and senior officials of the Congress. Technological self-sufficiency and ideological indoctrination also serve to ward off subversive ideas among the youth.

The sancta sanctorum of Chinese politics, the Politburo Standing Committee, is co-opted from among the most talented senior party officials. The 20th Congress approved a new version of the party constitution at Article 2: "Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era". While this revision does not add much to Xi's power in practice, nevertheless the exclusion of some prominent figures, such as Wang Yang, who began their careers in the Communist Youth League, is an indicator of the tight-control strategy pursued by Xi and, above all, the exclusion of the most prominent representatives among the reformers. The League was once a career avenue for many officials, including Xi's immediate predecessor Hu Jintao. But Xi called it arrogant and closed its school.

We are seeing a number of indicators suggesting a loss of momentum in economic growth. Incidentally, the service sector, the main driver of employment for the young and educated, continues to lag behind, with no clear objective or strategy in sight to remedy the situation.

According to a survey by the Global Times Research Center, young Chinese have a less favorable attitude towards the West in the last year, mainly due to the repression in some Western countries, their double standards and the ideological confrontation with China, as well as their own failures. But there is also a considerable part of them who recognize that China still lags behind the West and call for strengthened trade with Western countries.

The growing focus on self-sufficiency and security, rather than on growth per se, is also at the heart of the recent crackdown on some of China's fast-growing sectors – Internet technology and education –, which until recently were key sources of the growth of well-paying jobs.

But China's economic miracle was also built on integration with the outside world. Self-sufficiency is a seductive concept, particularly in an age of heightened geopolitical tensions. But for China it may be a blind alley.

 

CESI
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