UE 36: It Is Going to Be “Another Europe”

Jean Guy Giraud 
Former clerck of the European Court of Justice, Former Director of the European Parliament, Former President of the UEF-France

One of the “unintended consequences” of the Ukrainian conflict – whatever its outcome – will certainly be an acceleration and an extension of the Union’s enlargement.

The war provoked a sentiment of insecurity in eastern Europe, which has allowed to officialise in advance the candidacy of three new States in the Russian orbit: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

For the same reason the war will also compel the EU to expedit the adhesion (pre)negotiations with 6 states in the Balkans: Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania.

This adds to a EU of (27 + 3 + 6) = 36 Member States and of 600 million citizens taking shape in the relatively near future, in the order of a decade or so.

The composition of this Greater Europe will be marked by the important place that the formerly communist states of eastern, central and southern Europe will occupy. These 19 states (including the already-present ones) will represent:

• 52 % of the total of member states;
• 25 % of the total population of the EU 36 (i.e., 150 million out of 600 million).

Similarly, the EU 36 will be characterised by large differences in population size, even more than the EU 27, with:

• 5 “large” states with nearly 300 million people, i.e. 50% of the population;
• 9 “small” states with less than 2 million inhabitants each.

Hence, the great economic disparities already characterising the EU 27 will be amplified in the EU 36 following the inclusion of countries that are still scarcely developed. For example, we can note the current differences in GNP between:

• Germany (4,300 billion dollars) - France (3,000 billion);
• Ukraine (126 billion) - Serbia (65 billion).

By way of illustration, other profound transformations can be anticipated within EU36:

• Greater disparities, such as political, cultural and religious,
• An increase in governance complexity: increased risk of governmental instability, further burdening of EU institutions (issues with: number of members, decision-making processes, budgetary requirements, language disparities, etc.) and of management and control procedures,
• Increased risks in terms of respect for democratic rules/values on the Member states’ part, and of inter-state conflicts,
• Greater difficulty in reaching agreements on the development of common policies (agriculture, energy, currency, migration, etc.), particularly on foreign and security policy,
• Uncertainty about cohesion and solidarity between states – and even about their very conception of the nature of European integration.

All in all, the “diversity” – already present within the EU 27 – is likely to turn into factual heterogeneity, which would be way more difficult to manage, at least if the parallel objective of “unity” is to be maintained. 

This raises the question of whether the original model of integration – reaffirmed through previous enlargements and successive revisions of the Treaties – can be maintained in a EU 36.

It is certainly always possible to imagine clever mechanisms of “differentiated integration” or gradual integration – or even “concentric circles” or more or less federalised “cores” (such as for the Euro).

However, these attempts – on which it will be difficult to negotiate among 37 governments – seem rather uncertain.

It would therefore be legitimate to reflect now on the very nature of this greater Europe: should we envisage a model refocused on an enlarged, standardised and cooperative market – similar to that of EFTA or the OECD?

Can we conceive of an intergovernmental model inspired by the “European Political Community” project launched by Emmanuel Macron?

On the contrary, can the achievements of 70 years of economic and political integration be maintained – or even advanced? And if so, by what means?

In any case, the EU 36 will inevitably be “another Europe” in many respects. Is it premature to be concerned about this announced change? Judging by the difficulties and cumbersome nature of the reform – and even more so, the 'refounding' – processes that characterise the Union, it will never be too early to discuss it.

At the beginning of the 2000s, a mistake was made not to precede the first major enlargement with a prior and conditional reinforcement – with the result that a number of difficulties or blockages, yet to be resolved, quickly emerged. This should serve as a lesson for the forthcoming second major enlargement – even if the exercise of adapting the Union to this new continental entity is likely to prove even more complex, politically and technically, than the previous one.

Translated by Nicholas Serli