Franco-German Disagreement: How to Resolve It?

Antonio Padoa Schioppa 
Emeritus Professornof History of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. Former President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism.

The disagreement between France and Germany on European Union policies, the most alarming one since the end of World War II, has led a sharp observer such as Jacques Attali to write that even the possibility of a future military confrontation between the two countries can no longer be ruled out a priori. Let us hope that this is only a rallying cry, but surely there is a gap between the two governments, at least on the common European defence. How to overcome it? In my opinion, two key points should be highlighted. The first point concerns Germany. By all means, it is not taken for granted that the positions that Scholz seems to be advocating these days, or at least accredited by him, are shared by everyone in his country. Not only had he talked about common European defence in the past weeks, not only had the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs argued for its urgency, but so had, in different tones, the Strategic Compass approved by the EU last March and influential Bundestag members such as Schäuble and Roettgen.

The debate seems to be ongoing even in the German press and public opinion. It will be the election campaign for the upcoming 2024 European elections that will disclose what positions the major German parties, from the Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats to the Greens and Liberals, will take on this front.

The second point concerns France. President Macron has the means to make the German government and Parliament openly side with the strengthening of the European common defence and foreign policy.

He has to uphold two positions clearly: declaring, firstly, that the force de frappe will be conceived by France as an instrument for the defence of the entire Union, as requested in the previous months by Schäuble himself; and secondly, that the French seat at the UN, as regards strategic decisions, will be used as a European seat, while waiting for a reform of the Security Council invoked by many, and not only in Europe.

If Macron acts this way, it is highly possible that not only Germany, but also most EU Member States, including Italy, Spain, and Poland, will concretely adhere to the strengthening of European security. The war in Ukraine has revealed the absolute urgency of this strengthening project, even in the constant interallied connection within NATO and with the United States.

France must make the same apparent sacrifice of sovereignty that Germany has previously made when it gave up the mark, which has proven, over time, to be essential for Germany itself, as foreseen and declared by Kohl in the face of a hostile public opinion.

The interests of individual States and the values shared by the majority of EU citizens go in the same direction everywhere in Europe, including France. The just aspiration to sovereignty can only be protected in this way. Our future freedom and that of those who will come after us depend on it. However, we must not miss the fleeting moment. Tomorrow may be late.

Translated by Cecilia Mellana