Towards the Start of a Treaty Reform Procedure?

Roberto Castaldi
Associate professor of Political Philosophy at eCampus University, Director of the International Centre for European and Global Governance and of EURACTIV Italy, Co-editor of Perspectives on Federalism and member of the National Board of the European Federalist Movement

1. In June, the Parliament for the first time formally tabled 2 amendments – to Art. 29 and 48 (7) TEU – ex art. 48 TEU (see https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/https-www-euractiv-com-section-eu-priorities-2020-news-experts-criticise-shady-delay-of-eu-parliaments-treaty-reform-request/). Its position is strengthened by the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe. And now the Commission too has come out in favour of convening a Convention with Ursula von der Leyen’s State of the Union address. Informally, the Council has informed Parliament that there will now be a first informal discussion and the item will be put on the agenda at the December European Council (see https://www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/news/verhofstadt-after-ukraine-war-no-politician-has-the-guts-to-back-exit-from-eu/) . We can debate whether or not now is a favourable conjuncture for such a decision, or whether it would be better to focus on giving the Parliament a constituent mandate in the 2024 elections, as Virgilio Dastoli, President of the European Movement in Italy, proposes. But this would be of little use. The real fact is that this Parliament is the first with the courage to try to start a Treaty reform. If we want the 2024 European elections to be relevant, we have to back this Parliament up. If the reform process will get off the ground, that would be a political success for the Parliament, and will strengthen it, and open up a constituent battle in some form. If the Parliament loses the current struggle, it will be weakened. As difficult as its battle is, the Commission has finally sided with Parliament. And federalists must support the request of the supranational institutions, which are taking up the citizens’s requests during the Conference. Federalists cannot stand by and watch, because perhaps the Council will refuse to convene the Convention. The governments have no desire to reform the treaties. But it is objectively difficult even for them to refuse it and say that they don't care about the CoFoE, the Parliament and the Commission. If they do, the federalists should radically denounce it, and exploit the European elections to put forward the reform proposals of the European Parliament against the national governments that have disregarded the demands of the citizens in the CoFoE. But FIRST we must fight for the Convention as the outcome of the CoFoE and on the basis of the Parliament's initiative. In this respect, the position of the Italian MFE seems to me to be well-calibrated and its action should be intensified as far as possible.
   
   
2. It is not possible to predict the timing of the European Council decision and eventually of the Convention. It cannot be ruled out that the European Council will throw the ball back into the Parliament's court by inviting it to also prepare further amendments in the light of its June resolution in order to enable the European Council to make a more adequate assessment. Or that it decides that for two amendments alone there is no need for a Convention, but that an Intergovernmental Conference will suffice. In the meantime, the Parliament is preparing a Report that will express its position on every aspect of the Treaties and on all CoFoE proposals. It should serve to legitimise its representatives in the Convention to submit further amendments in the indicated direction, negotiating them together with the other components of the Convention. The Parliament proposed two formal amendments in order to legally oblige the national governments to put the start of the reform procedure on the agenda. And it has indicated a number of other reforms, in addition to those that emerged from CoFoE, to which the June Resolution also refers. Whether it succeeds in presenting a detailed amendments package before the start of the Convention, or does so within the Convention, it is clear that these proposals will be considered. If the Convention is underway, no one will want to reconvene, and all proposals will be addressed, including others that may come from member states. The states do not want to reform, but if the process starts they will prefer to deal with everything, rather than risk the Parliament tabling other amendments in a short time and starting again ... Depending on how this process develops, the eventual new Convention could have Parliament's proposals as the basic text, or the final outcome could be influenced by the European elections, or perhaps it could be subject to an advisory referendum at the time of the European elections. 
   
   
3. Our best ally is the geopolitical and energy impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The need to realise the energy Union is self-evident. In this sector, the cost of non-Europe is becoming simply unsustainable, and risks leading to a process of deindustrialisation in Europe. In August, we paid almost 9 times more for energy than the USA! A federal government would have already decoupled the cost of energy from the cost of gas; it would have identified a benchmark for gas different from the speculative market in Amsterdam; it would make joint purchases, as with vaccines, which would avoid competition between EU countries in dealing with the same suppliers; they cannot replace the EU as a whole as a destination, and would therefore be forced to negotiate long-term contracts at a reasonable price, if they had the EU as a counterpart. The market power of the EU, linked to its size, would act just like a legal cap on gas prices, lowering them. The federal government would finance the completion of the EU energy network, which according to a study by University College Dublin would reduce energy prices by 32%. It would initiate the creation of a common strategic reserve, to better cope with future and potentially asymmetric shocks. European citizens continue to pay the price of unanimity, that applies to measures that have an impact on the national energy mix or supply structure, and that are fiscal in nature (Art. 192 and 194 TFEU). This is one of the contradictions that can lead us to the Convention. 
   
   
4. On defence, the 27 Member states spend about three times as much as Russia. Still, they have no deterrence capacity to prevent Russia from invading its neighbours. And spending 2% domestically would change nothing. It would only increase the waste. It is another immense cost of non-Europe. Many countries are betting on NATO (think of Sweden and Finland's application for membership), even though the American umbrella is as solid as a Democratic presidency. With a Republican one it would probably be gone. Germany puts 100 billion into defence. This changes the picture. Either we proceed now on European defence, and the leadership will be French. Or an industrial-military apparatus will be consolidated in Germany, which will make it much more difficult to proceed. And eventually the leadership may have to be German. For now, some in Germany are proposing (Schauble’s interview in July) to put some of its 100 billion on European defence and French nuclear power, as part of a process of Europeanising the nuclear deterrent. This goes back to what Merkel advocated throughout the Trump presidency, asking France for a plan for political union. In renewing the Franco-German friendship treaty, Germany demanded the Europeanisation of the French UN seat, and France responded by backing a semi-permanent seat for Germany – which has no chance of seeing the light of day anyway. Scholz has relaunched the overcoming of unanimity in foreign policy, but France seems against it.
   
   
5. We are witnessing a choice between Europe and nationalism, and the governments' answers do not match their words or ideologies. France for now does not seem willing to share sovereignty on foreign policy and defence. But neither on energy, relying on its nuclear power and wanting to export energy (despite the fact that the recent drought has led to the closure of many nuclear power plants for lack of water to be used for cooling; a phenomenon that with climate change is likely to be repeated); it opposes the Midcat gas pipeline that should unite the Iberian peninsula (rich in regasifiers) with Germany and the rest of Europe (see https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/midcat-pipeline-stand-off-puts-eus-energy-solidarity-to-the-test/). Germany responds by taking the national route and putting up 200 billion over 3 years to lower the bill for households and businesses (as much as Italy's Recovery Plan PNRR over 5 years), which would completely blow up the single market as a level playing field. Yet both countries’ policies will have to change, because they are unsustainable. One cannot continue to spend three times as much as Russia without having an adequate military capacity, or pay 9 times as much for energy as the US without having an economic meltdown. The contradiction is very strong. Without creating European policies – that require competences and powers – all governing parties are bound to lose the next elections because of the energy crisis and its consequences.