A Political Treaty for a Greater Europe. For a Political Response to Ukraine’s Request

Mario Telò
Professor of International Relations at LUISS University of Rome and President Emeritus of the Institut d’Études Européennes of the Université libre de Bruxelles

False promises. Ukrainian President Zelensky's request for immediate EU membership. Respect for a fighter who defends our values with his heroic people and their resistance. He must be able to receive a political response. Certainly, immediate choices for help, including (for the first time) military. But we also owe him an effort to clarify the distinction between “a European perspective” and “immediate membership of EU institutions.

Art. 49 TEU legitimates the "application" of Ukraine to become a European State that respects our values. Nevertheless it raises four institutional issues (the institutions represent our common life, and cannot be neglected without weakening European democracy): the advisory role of the Commission (which can speed up its work, but its experts will be confronted with the impact of the statistical data (45 million inhabitants, with a per capita income of a quarter of the poorest country in the EU, Bulgaria) on the distribution of structural funds); the unanimous vote of the Council; the majority vote of the members of the European Parliament; the unanimous ratification by the parliaments (or by popular referendum) of the 27 States. It is a complex process and it can take years.

This is why Croatia negotiated for 10 years, Turkey has been a candidate state since 2004, Spain had to negotiate for 10 years, and the countries of the eastward enlargement had to wait, while approving the preliminary reforms, from 1989 to 2004, or even (in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) up to 2007.

Emotion is important in politics and one could choose to force the procedure. But not all member states agree, and ratifications would be problematic (as the 2016 Dutch referendum reminds us: 34% in favour!). Second problem: visiting Brussels on March 1, Salomé Zurabishvili, President of Georgia, reminded Ursula von der Leyen that “the former Soviet states Georgia and Moldova have all declared their intention to become members of the EU, are members of the bloc's Eastern Partnership initiative, and have association agreements with it, covering trade ties and integration issues”. Also the Georgian people fought against the Russian invasion and the continuing occupation of Abkhazia and Ossetia on 20% of their national territory. And let's not forget the positive opinion of the Commission (2021) on the opening of accession negotiations with the 6 Western Balkans states: Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia. It is obvious that the “fast track” asked for Ukraine will hardly be able to ignore these nine countries, in the waiting list for years (and each candidate has its protectors in the Council). So, what the promisers of miracles are selling to Zelenski would imply for the EU to go from 27 to 36 Member States, including a faithful friend of Putin's Russia, Serbia (a political contradiction): we risk the dilution and weakening of EU institutions, a sort of second Council of Europe.

In relation to the history of European construction, proceeding in this manner would be a historic turning point.

The balance between enlargement and deepening has always been the EU's Guiding Star. No reform of the treaty is announced. Unfortunately, the Conference on the Future of Europe is a failure, there will be no massive recommendation for a more federal Europe. Macron will not be able to announce an Inter-Governmental Conference for a new treaty in May so easily (the mandate must be unanimous). So the consequences of an enlargement to 9 Member States without prior deepening and institutional reform would not be difficult to predict: the institutions would objectively risk paralysis; think of the Council of International Affairs, where unanimous voting is required and some members States are used to play the "veto-game", blocking the action of Josep Borrell for reasons of internal politics. Or in the Commission, with 36 members! The federal (or at least the Qualified Majority Voting) perspective of the EU would be severely affected.

So, the interrogations of the experts are part of our duty: they do not have a "legalistic" origin, but twice political. On the one hand, the internal democratic legitimacy of the decisions; on the other hand, the possibility for the EU to take advantage of this favorable moment to take steps forward towards our priorities: a strategic autonomy, a defense union, a world-power role. Without this progress the EU would be weakened in an increasingly dangerous world. Who is interested in a more fragile EU? It is the opposite of the EU becoming a geopolitical power.

The alternative: an innovation in the European institutional architecture. It is absolutely necessary to give a positive and innovative answer to the demand for a European perspective of the Ukrainians in their fight against a dictator who, according to some information, is behaving like a criminal against humanity. A third approach is needed between the membership policy and the neighborhood policy. The "European perspective" must have a more visible and identity-based concretization, allowing Ukrainians to feel from now on part of the renewed European perspective and live up to the change-of-era that is in the making. This institutional strategy must have a predominantly political character, clearly distinct from the European Economic Area or the Council of Europe. We propose to revive the idea of a European architecture organized in concentric circles: the EU, in turn already organized in several circles; the federal core of the euro zone (19 members); the EU of 27; and the wider circle, i.e. the confederal “Greater Europe” of the 35, open to new members, in particular to those who choose freedom over Putin's autocracy (note: without any implication in terms of the obligation to guarantee security, as NATO's Art. 5). This architecture would be tolerated by Russia as part of a compromise which would not contemplate any NATO enlargement and would revive the OSCE.

This is a historic moment: new institutions are built in times like this.

It is necessary to relaunch, by an initiative of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/VicePresident of the Commission (HR/VP) at the European Council, what Mitterrand in 1989-91 opposed to Mrs. Thatcher's proposal for an immediate and generalized entry of the countries of Eastern Europe into the EU (the use of widening versus deepening: the Maastricht Treaty was at stake).

The "Greater Europe" would have at its head a Council composed of 35 States (with majority voting in the event of human rights violations), but also a common parliamentary Assembly, which would invite the HR/VP in its programmatic debates for matters of CFSP. This new confederal treaty, drawn up with the necessary caution, should be able to strengthen all the association agreements that already exist with these countries, multiplying cooperation programs at the level of the internal market, in economic, cultural, educational, energy, transport fields, etc. Everything except touching the EU institutions.

Is it a multi-speed Europe? No; rather, it is a dynamic and not fixed political architecture, to be proposed to the continent, in which the second treaty of a confederal nature (the Greater Europe) would have a political objective: peace and the prevention of conflicts through economic integration and multidimensional cooperation, while ensuring a strong sense of European belonging to the Member States. And it only depends on the political will of the European Council.