The International Clout Acquired by Beijing

Adriana Castagnoli
Historian of Economy, editorialist of the daily “Il Sole-24 Ore”, former teacher in Contemporary and Economic History at the University of Torino, member of the European Business History Association and Business History Conference (USA)

The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order *

Hanns W. Maull (ed.)

Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018

At the beginning of this century, the liberal international order has been subjected to tensions that have eroded its performance and legitimacy, opening the way to a transition phase leading to a new world order, still unclear and quite precarious. According to Hanns W. Maull, editor of this volume, the year of no-return was 2016. The West had been weakened by internal upheavals and the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. The challenge by China, the new power on the rise, became more menacing, and more insidious are the aspirations to revanche by Russia, the old frustrated power.

The great powers with “ordering” prerogatives, the United States and China, have started an uncertain and hazardous re-negotiation of global relations and regulations. Other important players like the EU, India and Russia could aspire to the role of “ordering powers”, but with little chance of success. The EU, although it does have the resources for getting that role, has failed so far the tests of coherence, compactness and determination, showing that it does not possess the political will for acting as a determining force in world politics. Russia is a declining power whose global importance is based on conventional and unconventional military might, on its diplomatic resources and on its oil reserves, but it lacks the necessary economic and social resources. Only in the Middle East and in the nuclear sector did Moscow succeed in acquiring a significant role, although without “ordering” prerogatives. As for India, it looks improbable that it could get to that role even in the future.

China started to reconsider its relations with the international order in 2008, when the global financial and economic crisis hit the United States, the EU and other Western States. In the frailty of the global political balances, Beijing seized the opportunity to implement its new doctrine in foreign policy, that aims not only to reform the existing international institutions, but also to create new ones in order to bring about “the democratization of international relations”. Beijing's viewpoint - as results from this collective work- is that decisions regarding the international order should not be taken only by the USA and its allies in Europe and in Asia, but by all the members of the United Nations. To support that doctrine, its Politburo has unilaterally started infrastructural projects like the Belt and Road Initiative, and set up financial institutions like the New Development Bank and the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank.

In a time of de-globalization, when the Trump Administration embraces “America First” policies and economic nationalism, Beijing has proposed itself as the propelling force of globalization. In his speech at the UN Assembly in 2015 to celebrate its 70^th anniversary, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping launched a series of initiatives to strengthen the global governance. But although in its political narrative Beijing emphasizes China's reformist role in the international order, it still has in practice a conservative function on crucial matters like the reform of the UN Security Council.

China's approach to the international order -as can be seen in this volume- is based on four pillars. The recognition of its status as a great power, in particular by the USA. The relations with its neighbors in East Asia, to be considered as an area of its own primary influence. The relations with the developing countries, with whom it promotes its model of changing the international order from within. Multilateralism, the most recent “pillar”, emerged only in 2005.

After Trump's election, America's involvement in the liberal multilateral system has become much weaker. This has made China's role stronger, and now China is proposing itself as the champion of free trade and multilateral agreements. So much so that also Japan is contemplating a rapprochement with China. However, protectionism and unfair practices have made the agreements with the EU and Canada more problematic.

Of course, China’s multilateralism differs from the European approach. “For the EU, multilateralism has always been a way to augment its limited capabilities, hoping that it would be able to constrain the great powers through universal institutionalism. China’s concept of multilateralism is compatible with great power politics, of course in support of their own policies.” And both the USA and China see themselves as “exceptional powers”.

Meanwhile, the “playing field of world politics” has become more crowded. Still, the central and crucial axis in the new power structure appears to be the complex relationship between the United States and China.

* This book review was published in the daily Il Sole-24 Ore on 1^st December 2019

Translated by Lionello Casalegno